Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review by Virelli, Louis J., III
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 92 | Number 3 Article 2
3-1-2014
Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Louis J. Virelli III
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




LouIs J. VIRELLI III*
Arbitrary and capricious-or "hard look"-review is a
legitimizing force in a political and legal environment that is
increasingly hostile to administrative government. It is thus no
surprise that arbitrary and capricious review is a recurring topic
of debate for both courts and commentators. Despite this active
focus on hard look review, however, a crucial point has been
overlooked. Existing scholarship overwhelmingly portrays
arbitrary and capricious review as one-dimensional-as applying
the same standard in the same way across all manner of agency
conduct. This Article reconceptualizes hard look review as a
multidimensional expression of judicial deference and argues
that arbitrariness review is both more effective and more easily
justified when it is "deconstructed "-when it first divides
administrative policymaking into its constituent parts, such as
record building, reason giving, input scope and quality, and
rationality. This deconstruction exposes arbitrary and capricious
review for what I contend it is and should be: a collection of
more particularized inquiries into specific components of agency
decision making. Deconstruction also provides a new theoretical
framework in which arbitrary and capricious review tailors
judicial deference to discrete aspects of agency decision making.
Finally, deconstruction offers institutional and systemic benefits
that help clarify how hard look review should be utilized in
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different contexts and how courts should defer to the political
branches more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
In an environment where questions about the cost and scope of
administrative government dominate our political discourse,'
1. A recent and powerful example of the level of disagreement over the proper role
of administrative government was the heated debate in 2013 over the automatic spending
cuts widely known as the "sequester." See, e.g., Chris Cilliza, After the Sequestration
Stalemate, Things Will Only Get Worse, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/in-the-sequestration-battle-things-will-only-get-worse/2013/03
/03/f4ba0990-8412-11e2-9d71-f0feafddl394 story.html?hpid=z1 ("The parties are deeply
divided over the right path forward when it comes to healing the economy and lowering
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arbitrary and capricious-or "hard look"-review of agency
decisions2 is an important source of legitimacy for the administrative
state.' It embodies the difficult and persistent question in American
public law of "who decides" issues of law or policy.' By incorporating
principles of judicial deference to agency conduct, hard look review
provides a critical check against unconstrained agency power while
still protecting agency expertise and independence from overreaching
by the courts.' It also serves an important political purpose by
the debt. Obama continues to advocate for ... tax increases and spending cuts.
Republicans believe ... that the only thing that needs to be done now is to cut."); Richard
W. Stevenson, G.O.P. Clings to One Thing It Agrees On: Spending Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/us/politics/gop-lacking-unity-clings-to-
budget-goals.html?hp&-r=0 (suggesting that the sequester is evidence that the "the only
issue that truly unites Republicans is a commitment to shrinking the federal government
through spending cuts, low taxes and less regulation").
2. "Arbitrary and capricious review," "arbitrariness review," and "hard look review"
will be used interchangeably throughout the Article to refer to judicial review of agency
policymaking under the standard articulated by the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
3. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons For Agency
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 395 ("In this country, judicial review and the legitimacy of
administrative government are inextricably intertwined.").
4. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991
SUP. CT. REV. 225, 228 (formulating an inductive, "minimal" conception to separation of
powers issues that connects rulings of unconstitutionality to attempts by Congress to
create a "Fourth Branch"); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About
Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 433 (1987)
(encouraging deeper analysis of separation of powers doctrine beyond the traditional
formalist-functionalist dichotomy and arguing that the debate encompasses issues about
the "legitimacy of the modem administrative process"); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 578 (1984) ("[T]he rigid separation-of-powers compartmentalization of governmental
functions should be abandoned in favor of analysis in terms of separation of functions and
checks and balances."). See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962) (discussing judicial review of legislative conduct); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (discussing judicial review of legislative conduct);
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1515-16 (1991) (arguing that "the Madisonian goal of avoiding tyranny through the
preservation of separated powers should inform the Supreme Court's analysis in cases
raising constitutional issues involving the structure of government").
5. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 183 (2011) (explaining that "hard look
review ... advances republican values by enmeshing administrative lawmaking within
constraints that are roughly equivalent to the checks and balances of Articles I and II");
Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61
DUKE L.J. 1763, 1772 (2012) ("Naturally, expertise also figures into judicial review as a
reason for deference to agencies."); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World
of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 768 (2008) (advocating "arbitrariness
review" as a "safeguard[] for the decline of constitutional checks on agency authority");
Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
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protecting against agency choices that run afoul of our democratic
expectations. 6 It is no surprise then, in light of both its legal and
political significance, that arbitrary and capricious review is a
frequent topic of discussion for both courts and commentators.
The current discussion, however, overlooks a critical point. It
treats arbitrary and capricious review as one-dimensional by applying
the same standard in the same way across all manner of agency
conduct.' This Article rejects this one-dimensional approach and
offers a new perspective on arbitrary and capricious review. Rather
than treat arbitrariness review as a singular concept or standard, this
Article reconceptualizes hard look review as a multifaceted and
diverse manifestation of judicial deference. It argues that
arbitrariness review is both more effective and more easily justified
when it is "deconstructed"-when it divides administrative
policymaking into its constituent parts, such as record building,
reason giving, input scope and quality, and rationality.' This shift in
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 440-47 (2003) (considering judicial
review as a check on potentially excessive administrative authority and identifying hard
look review as "necessary to enforce [republican] ideals").
6. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REV. 363, 391 (1986) ("The stricter the review and the more clearly and convincingly
the agency must explain the need for change, the more reluctant the agency will be to
change the status quo."); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine
and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WiS. L.
REV. 763, 821 ("When courts invoke the hard look doctrine, they force agencies to adopt a
decisional process designed to ensure that the relevant reasons for change-namely, those
public values enshrined in the Rule of Law through a democratic process-are identified
and implemented, or force agencies to articulate alternative reasons.").
7. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 1, 29 (2009) ("[S]cholars have spent inordinate amounts of time
debating hard look review and criticizing it on a variety of grounds."); see, e.g., Jack M.
Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856,
880-82 (2007) (disputing hard look review's apparent inconsistency with Vermont
Yankee); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 395 (2000) (summarizing the ossification
arguments of opponents to hard look review); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont
Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
902, 904-10 (2007) (arguing that intrusive arbitrary and capricious review is inconsistent
with the minimal procedural requirements imposed by the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the APA in Vermont Yankee); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 145-48 (2012) (responding to
Professor Watts and discussing the relevance of political influences in hard look review).
8. For a more detailed discussion of the existing scholarly treatment of arbitrary and
capricious review, see infra Part I.B.
9. The suggested process of dividing administrative decision making into its
constituent parts will be hereafter referred to as "deconstruction" of arbitrary and
capricious review. For present purposes, the term deconstruction is used in its broadest
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perspective exposes arbitrary and capricious review for what it should
be: a collection of more particularized inquiries into specific
components of agency decision making.
Deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review in this manner
offers several tangible benefits. First, it more accurately describes
how courts, especially the Supreme Court, apply arbitrary and
capricious review to individual agency determinations. This is
potentially useful in and of itself as a means of bringing greater
coherence to a doctrine aptly described by Professors Sidney Shapiro
and Richard Levy as "open-ended" and lacking in "precise content."10
Deconstruction is not, however, simply or even primarily descriptive.
It is in fact fundamentally prescriptive. Despite employing features of
deconstructed arbitrary and capricious review in their analyses,
neither commentators nor courts have articulated a theoretical
construct to explain or defend that approach. This project is the first
to not only offer a robust view of deconstruction, but also to treat it as
a theoretically coherent concept. Doing so allows us to use the
deconstruction model to evaluate each of the components of agency
conduct against the underlying principles of judicial deference and
goals of hard look review. This provides a new, dynamic perspective
on arbitrariness review that tailors judicial deference to discrete
aspects of agency decision making. It permits arbitrariness review to
consider an agency's failure to provide any explanation whatsoever
for a policy decision, for instance, differently from a decision to
consider specific social or economic factors in reaching that same
conclusion. Although either of these choices may be arbitrary,
deconstruction is the first systematic approach to consider the
appropriate level of judicial deference for each separate choice. The
overarching result is a new and more thorough picture of how courts
should engage with individual agency policy decisions. Finally,
deconstruction allows us to appreciate the corresponding institutional
sense. It does not, for example, refer to the school of literary theory and philosophy of
language derived principally from Jacques Derrida's work. See generally JACQUES
DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., corrected ed. 1997)
(arguing that the methods of recording thoughts have a profound effect on the nature of
knowledge, and arguing for deconstruction of the relationship between oral language and
written language). Deconstruction in the present context instead refers to the more
general meaning from the Oxford English Dictionary: "To undo the construction of, to
take to pieces." III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 106 (1st ed. 1961).
10. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1065-66 (1995)
("[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard is relatively open-ended, and the Supreme Court
has not given it more precise content.").
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and systemic reasons to treat arbitrary and capricious review as a
multidimensional exercise. These in turn increase our understanding
of how and when hard look review should be employed in different
contexts and of when courts should defer to the political branches
more generally.
Part I of this Article highlights current perspectives on hard look
review. It describes the Supreme Court's use of hard look review
since its seminal decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe" and reviews the relevant legal scholarship on hard look
review during that period. It concludes that although commentators
and the Court have identified several issues within hard look review,
they have neither developed all of those issues nor formulated a
coherent theory for incorporating them into their broader
understanding of arbitrariness review. Part II fills this gap by
deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review into two broad
categories-first- and second-order review-each of which consists of
multiple subparts. It then articulates the theoretical distinctions
among these deconstructed parts to provide an entirely new
perspective on arbitrary and capricious review.
Part III examines the benefits of deconstruction. It measures
deconstructed arbitrariness review against the primary rationales put
forth for judicial deference to administrative agencies-institutional
competency or expertise and political legitimacy-as well as the
underlying purposes of hard look review, and it offers a normative
argument for why deconstruction promotes better judicial review in
individual cases. It goes on to outline the institutional and systemic
benefits that arise from deconstructing hard look review, such as
improving its accuracy, efficacy, and predictability and promoting
increased comity between the political branches and the courts. Part
III finishes by addressing the potential costs of deconstruction, and
explains why they are outweighed by deconstruction's normative,
institutional, and systemic benefits. This Article concludes by
reiterating how treating hard look review as a multidimensional
concept promotes not only better administrative governance, but also
a more responsive and cooperative constitutional democracy.
I. UNDER-THEORIZED ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW
The federal courts are no strangers to arbitrary and capricious
review. Yet despite its relative ubiquity in administrative law, hard
look review remains under-theorized by courts and commentators.
11. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
726 [Vol. 92
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Deconstruction offers a coherent framework for judicial review that
embraces the complexity and multidimensional nature of
administrative policymaking and thereby newly empowers courts to
incorporate the full breadth and depth of agency conduct into hard
look review.
Arbitrary and capricious review is rooted in the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA").12 Around the time of the APA's adoption,
arbitrariness review mirrored the highly deferential rational basis
review employed by pre-APA courts." As Professor Richard Pierce
explained, "an agency needed no evidence, no record, and no
statement of reasons to support a rule; rules were rarely challenged;
and challenges were rarely successful."14 In the 1960s and 1970s, the
interest group model and concerns about agency capture emerged as
dominant features of administrative law." The result was a movement
in the lower courts to develop a more rigorous approach to arbitrary
and capricious review in hopes of protecting the public against
imbalanced political influences on agency conduct.16 The D.C. Circuit
12. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (requiring a reviewing court to set aside "agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
13. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1252 (1986) ("As in its initial phase, the New Deal continued its propensity to
address particularized areas of unrest through regulation by experts .... "); id. at 1266
("With the final legitimation of the New Deal came the acceptance of a central precept of
public administration: faith in the ability of experts to develop effective solutions .... ");
Matthew Warren, Note, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development of the
Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599, 2601 (2002) ("Even after the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 created a presumption of reviewability of agency
action, judicial review of administrative agencies remained generally deferential."
(footnotes omitted)).
14. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 81 (2008); see also Watts, supra
note 7, at 15 (explaining that "[a]fter the APA was enacted in 1946, things did not change
much" regarding the standard for arbitrariness review of agency action).
15. See Watts, supra note 7, at 15-16, 34 n.145 (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761 (2007))
(describing the move to an interest group model-which promotes participation in the
decision-making process to reflect all affected interests-due, at least in part, to concerns
about agency capture); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-
1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (describing capture theory as a "pathology"
in which "agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to domination by the
industry they were charged with regulating").
16. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761 (2007) ("Administrative law reflected the interest group
representation model by building up the reasoned decisionmaking requirement, also
known as the 'hard look doctrine.' "). The predominant view has since shifted from the
interest group model to the presidential control model. See id. at 1763 ("By the 1980s,
administrative law theory and doctrine had transitioned to presidential control of agency
decisionmaking as a principal mechanism for legitimating such decisionmaking.").
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ultimately coined the term "hard look" review to describe this new
approach to arbitrary and capricious review, 7 and the two phrases
have since become interchangeable in describing the application of
the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard.
The Supreme Court echoed the lower courts' movement toward
more rigorous review in Overton Park,'" and cemented the
applicability of hard look review in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company.19 Since its adoption of hard look review, the
Court has used relatively consistent language to describe its approach
to reviewing agency policy decisions,2 0 but has in fact applied the
concept of arbitrariness differently in a wide range of cases. These
varied applications demonstrate the need for deconstruction's
unifying perspective.
Hard look review is a "searching and careful" process by which a
court reviews an agency's policymaking process to ensure that it does
not exceed the proper bounds of administrative discretion.2' The
ultimate judicial inquiry, however, is described as a "narrow one,"
one in which a "court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency" on a particular policy matter.22 Reviewing courts
generally ask whether an agency determination represents a "clear
error of judgment" or is "so implausible that it could not be ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise."23 In
performing their reviews, however, courts-and especially the
17. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating
that an agency decision should be overturned "if the court becomes aware, especially from
a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the
salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making." (footnote
omitted)).
18. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971).
19. 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).
20. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) ("[A]n
agency [must] examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action." (internal quotation marks omitted)); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48 ("We have
frequently reiterated that an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its
discretion in a given manner. ); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) ("[W]hen there is a contemporaneous
explanation of the agency decision, the validity of that action must 'stand or fall on the
propriety of that finding .... ' ); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 ("[Review of the agency
decision] is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at
the time he made his decision.").
21. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
22. Id.
23. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (citing Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)).
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Supreme Court-have outlined a wide array of agency conduct that
could be brought to bear on that question. For instance, the Supreme
Court routinely cites the requirement that an agency consider the
"relevant factors" before making its policy decision.24 It has likewise
considered the existence and quality of the administrative record
supporting the agency's decision,25 the presence and persuasiveness of
the agency's explanation for that decision,26 and the "rational
connection" between the agency's explanation and its ultimate policy
position in determining arbitrariness.27
While each of these considerations may be valid ways to establish
whether an agency acted arbitrarily, they are not simply
interchangeable. It is very different, for example, to say that an
agency failed in its duty to provide a reasoned explanation of its
decision by failing to provide any reasons whatsoever than to claim
that an agency failed because it offered reasons that the court deemed
inadequate to rationally justify that decision. The former constitutes
judicial oversight of a simple disclosure requirement, while the latter
represents a rejection of the agency's policy judgment. As a matter of
judicial deference, these decisions implicate very different principles
and concerns regarding judicial influence over the political branches.
It is thus important to treat them accordingly. The Court, however,
has failed to do so, often evaluating several distinct types of agency
conduct in a single arbitrariness decision. The result is a weakening of
the theoretical foundations of arbitrary and capricious review that
does a disservice to administrative law and the relationships among
our public institutions. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence and the
relevant academic commentary in the area highlight the potential
value of deconstruction to arbitrary and capricious review.
A. Arbitrariness Review in the Supreme Court
The Court's most notable treatments of hard look review can be
found in three cases-Overton Park, State Farm, and FCC v. Fox
24. See id. at 42-43.
25. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (explaining that judicial review of an agency's
decision must be "based on the full administrative record that was before the [agency]" at
the time of the decision and that if the record is not sufficiently developed to permit such a
review, "it may be necessary for the District Court to require some explanation").
26. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52 (holding that "the agency's explanation for
rescission of the passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable us to conclude
that the rescission was the product of reasoned decisionmaking").
27. Id. at 43 (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
2014] 729
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Television Stations, Inc.28 -spanning more than three decades. In
Overton Park, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred
when it affirmed the Secretary of Transportation's ("Secretary")
provision of funds for the construction of a federal highway through a
public park in Memphis, Tennessee. 29 The Court ruled that the lower
courts erred by relying on litigation affidavits rather than on the
administrative record before the Secretary at the time of his decision
in evaluating whether the Secretary's funding decision was arbitrary
and capricious." The Court went on, however, to point out that "since
[on remand] the bare record may not disclose the factors that were
considered [by the Secretary] . . . it may be necessary for the District
Court to require some explanation in order to determine if the ...
Secretary's action was justifiable.""1 The possible courses of action for
the district court famously included "requir[ing] the administrative
officials who participated in the decision to give testimony explaining
their action."3 2 Overton Park represents an acknowledgment by the
Court that hard look review is not limited to the quality of an
agency's final policy position but that it in fact can be based upon a
purely procedural concept. The lack of a complete administrative
record could be, regardless of the quality and rationality of the
agency's ultimate policy decision, sufficient on its own to invalidate
agency action as arbitrary and capricious.
The Court's landmark decision in State Farm built on Overton
Park's recognition of alternative grounds for finding arbitrariness. It
offers a powerful example of the Court taking a monolithic approach
to the multifaceted problem of hard look review. In State Farm, the
Court addressed whether the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's ("NHTSA") decision to rescind a rule requiring
passive restraints in new automobiles was arbitrary and capricious.3 3
The Court concluded that it was arbitrary and capricious on three
separate, and very different, grounds. The first was the NHTSA's
total failure to consider whether airbag technology alone, as opposed
to a manufacturer's choice between passive seatbelts and airbags,
could be an effective way to meet the Agency's desired safety
standards.34 The Court did not focus on whether airbags were indeed
28. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
29. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 406.
30. See id. at 409, 420.
31. Id. at 420.
32. Id.
33. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 40-57 (1983).
34. See id. at 46-51.
730 [Vol. 92
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a desirable safety improvement or whether it would have been
rational for the Agency to reach that conclusion, but it instead
focused solely on the fact that the Agency "apparently gave no
consideration whatever" to the viability of an airbags-only
requirement.35 Because the "agency submitted no reasons at all" for
its decision, the Court found its decision impermissibly arbitrary.3 6
In a much closer decision, the Court also held that the NHTSA
acted arbitrarily because it "was too quick to dismiss the safety
benefits of automatic seatbelts."3 7 Rather than rely on a total lack of
agency explanation, the Court in the automatic seatbelt context found
that the Agency's conclusion was flawed because it did not reflect the
Agency "bring[ing] its expertise to bear on the question."" More
specifically, the Court criticized the NHTSA's decision to exclude
detachable passive belts on the grounds that people failed to use
"active" manual belts.39 It concluded that the NHTSA fatally missed
the point that detachable belts require an affirmative act to
disconnect them, and therefore that inertia-which was the Agency's
stated concern for why any kind of belt is unlikely to be effective-
"works in favor of, not against, use of the [detachable belt]."4 0 In this
instance, the Court found arbitrariness in what it perceived as a
logically flawed policy position; it held that the Agency acted
arbitrarily because there was no rational basis for its conclusion to
exclude detachable seatbelts from its safety standard.
In yet another portion of its opinion, the Court in State Farm
reviewed a procedural omission by the NHTSA but criticized the
Agency's decision in terms of its substantive irrationality. The Court
stated that the Agency acted arbitrarily not only by failing to consider
airbags separately from seatbelts and by irrationally concluding that
35. Id. at 46. The Court in State Farm may have believed that an airbags-only
standard, if considered by the Agency, would have at minimum qualified as a rational
safety measure based on the administrative record. For purposes of deconstruction,
however, the fact that the Court may have had one eye on the rationality of the NHTSA's
conclusion is not nearly as significant as the fact that the Court explicitly relied on a
completely different agency choice-the decision not to analyze the airbags-only option at
all-to find the Agency's conduct arbitrary. This conflation of different categories of
agency conduct is precisely the difficulty that deconstruction seeks to remedy in the
interest of bringing greater precision, clarity, and accountability to hard look review. The
Court's own explanation of its reasoning in State Farm is thus further evidence of the
promise of deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review.
36. Id. at 50.
37. Id. at 51.
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detachable belts were no better than manual belts, but also by failing
to "separately consider the [nondetachable] belt option" as part of its
safety standard.41 In this case, although seemingly dealing with a
simple failure of the Agency to articulate any reasons for its decision,
the Court explained that "[b]y failing to analyze the [nondetachable
belt] option in its own right, the agency has failed to offer the rational
connection between facts and judgment required to pass muster
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard."4 2 This third part of the
analysis thus appears to conflate the Agency conduct of publishing
reasons with its creation of a logical nexus between those reasons and
the Agency's ultimate policy position. The different aspects of the
Court's arbitrariness analysis in State Farm demonstrate the analysis's
versatility and highlight the Court's failure to provide any coherent
explanation as to whether or how arbitrariness review can
accommodate widely divergent administrative contexts.
Another example of how the Court has employed arbitrary and
capricious review in different ways is its recent decision in Fox
Television. In that case, the Court asked whether the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") acted arbitrarily when it
announced a new, more restrictive policy on the broadcasting of
"fleeting expletives."43 Citing the familiar doctrinal standard for
establishing arbitrariness, the Court concluded that the FCC had not
acted arbitrarily in changing its policy because the "agency's reasons
... were entirely rational."" It went on to review the various
justifications in the administrative record and to confirm the
rationality of each of them. For instance, the Court noted that the
FCC's "predictive judgment" that creating a blanket exception for
fleeting expletives would "lead to increased use of expletives ...
makes entire sense" and was "an exercise in logic rather than
clairvoyance."4 5 Unlike its decisions in Overton Park and State Farm,
the Court in Fox Television focused entirely on the quality of the
Agency's reasoning and evaluated the Agency's final policy
determination solely on (highly deferential) rationality grounds.46
This is very different from deciding that a failure to build a record or
to offer any explanation whatsoever for a particular position
41. Id. at 55.
42. Id. at 56.
43. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 512-13 (2009), vacated, 132 S.
Ct. 2307 (2012).
44. Id. at 517.
45. Id. at 521.
46. See id. at 517-18.
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constitutes arbitrary agency conduct. The Court's approach in Fox
Television is further evidence that arbitrariness review is a
multidimensional process that is often not properly understood or
treated as such by the Court.
This overview of the Supreme Court's hard look jurisprudence is
important for present purposes not as a focus of doctrinal criticism,
but as evidence of the need for-and current lack of-a more
nuanced way of dealing with the concept of arbitrariness in
administrative law. The above examples of arbitrary and capricious
review by the Court invoke very different types of agency conduct
and, albeit implicitly, very different perspectives regarding the proper
degree of judicial deference toward that conduct. Despite these
important differences, neither the courts nor commentators have so
far attempted to articulate whether, how, or why these inherent
variations in agency policymaking affect arbitrariness review.
B. Scholarly Treatment of Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Judicial review of agency action, including arbitrary and
capricious review, is an exceedingly popular topic among
administrative law scholars.47 Like the Supreme Court, however,
scholars have largely overlooked the multidimensional nature of
agency policymaking in their treatment of hard look review. Even the
most active scholarly conversations about arbitrary and capricious
review simply do not include the concept of deconstruction. For
example, there is a long-running debate around the claim that hard
look review leads to the ossification of agency rulemaking.48 A second
47. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 7, at 29 (observing the vast amounts of time scholars
have dedicated to the topic).
48. Ossification is the "the extreme cost and delay attendant to the use of notice and
comment procedures to issue a rule." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 59 n.1 (1995) (citing Thomas 0. McGarity,
Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 1992 DUKE L.J. 1385). For
examples from the scholarly debate surrounding ossification, see, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of
Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483 (1997) ("Articles lamenting
the recent 'ossification' of notice and comment rulemaking seem to be the fashion in
administrative law scholarship today."). See generally Jordan, supra note 7, at 395
(questioning "whether the hard look version of arbitrary and capricious review has in fact
led to the ossification of informal rulemaking"); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 529
(1997) ("Although I agree with Professor Seidenfeld that hard look judicial review is not
the only factor contributing [to] the present ossification of the rulemaking process, I am
more concerned than he is about its potential to disrupt ongoing agency programs, and I
am less concerned about the potential for irrational decisionmaking that might result from
reduced judicial scrutiny."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in
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discussion addresses the question of whether arbitrariness review
could interfere with the minimal procedural requirements of the APA
and thus run afoul of the Court's prohibition on judicially-created
procedures in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.," and a third has emerged regarding
the proper role (if any) of political considerations in hard look
review.s0
In the few instances where authors do show some interest in
categorizing hard look review, they do so in a way that is notably
distinct from deconstruction. Professor Richard Pierce singles out one
aspect of hard look review in his 2009 article about the relevant
factors an agency may consider in its decision making.s' Besides the
fact that it addresses only one of the many categories of agency
conduct included in deconstruction, Professor Pierce's purpose is
almost exclusively doctrinal; he explores the recent judicial opinions
dealing with relevant factors and offers his thoughts and predictions
for the future direction of the case law.52 He does not address how the
relevant factors analysis relates to other categories of agency conduct,
or whether those other categories might be amenable to individual
treatment.
Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (1989)
("There is mounting evidence that fear of judicial rejection of a policy based on the
requirement of reasoned decisionmaking has introduced into the policymaking process
delay and resource commitments so great that some agencies have abandoned their efforts
and policymaking completely.").
49. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See generally Beermann & Lawson, supra note 7, at 880-82
(discussing the tension between hard look review and the principles of Vermont Yankee);
Pierce, supra note 7, at 904-10 (responding to Beermann and Lawson's arguments in favor
of hard look review and arguing that hard look review is inherently unpredictable); Paul
R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55
TUL. L. REv. 418 (1981) ("Ultimately . .. the Supreme Court will have to reconcile the
apparently conflicting [precedents] in order to achieve a final resolution of the scope of
review standard.").
50. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245
(2001) (discussing how the Clinton administration helped establish a system of
"presidential administration" of agencies in which a president's policies and political
agenda shape the administrative state); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political"
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127,1131 (2010) (stating "any
discussion of political reasons [behind administrative actions] cannot be finally resolved
without improving the transparency of the decision-making process"); Watts, supra note 7
(arguing for an expanded conception of arbitrary and capricious review that acknowledges
political influences).
51. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a




In a 2005 book chapter, Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman
describes the various bases upon which courts employ the rational
connection approach to hard look review-the requirement that an
agency's ultimate policy conclusion be rationally related to the
administrative record." Professor Bressman's analysis is certainly
relevant to the idea of deconstruction, as it also seeks to identify the
sub-issues informing judicial review of agency policymaking.54 It does
not, however, go as far either descriptively or normatively as the
present project.5 First, Professor Bressman's account focuses
primarily on lower court opinions and does so with regard to only one
of the subgroups uncovered by deconstruction: the rational
connection doctrine.5 6 Second, Professor Bressman's account is
descriptive; it stops short of any normative claims about the factors
informing hard look review.57 Deconstruction, by contrast, closely
examines the Supreme Court's hard look jurisprudence and unpacks
all aspects of arbitrary and capricious review in pursuit of normative
guidance for both agencies and courts. This normative focus is critical
to deconstruction's contribution, as it provides a new and powerful
insight into the interaction between agencies and courts over
important matters of public policy.
In a 1996 article, Professor Gary Lawson recognizes that
"observers of the federal administrative scene have not adequately
distinguished among judicial review of the outcome of the agency
proceeding, the procedures employed by the agency in reaching that
outcome, and the process of decision making, or chain of reasoning,
by which the agency reached its conclusions."" Although he does
explore the theoretical distinctions among these three aspects of
agency policymaking, he applies them across multiple standards of
review (arbitrariness, substantial evidence, and Chevron deference)
and refrains from making any of the finer distinctions present in
53. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Discretion, in A GUIDE TO
JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 177, 180 (John F. Duffy &
Michael Herz eds., 2005) (introducing the "components of arbitrary and capricious
review" and noting the lack of any "rules of thumb" for applying the standard).
54. See id. at 181-95 (reviewing a number of reasons courts reverse agency actions).
55. See Michael Herz & John F. Duffy, Preface to A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND
POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 53, at xii-xiii (explaining the
project that gave rise to the book as "describ[ing] federal administrative law in a manner
that would be both manageable and comprehensive").
56. See Bressman, supra note 53, at 181-95.
57. See id.
58. Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 313, 316 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
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deconstruction.5 9 Perhaps most importantly, Professor Lawson does
not engage in any comparative normative analysis among the various
categories of agency conduct.
Professors Sid Shapiro and Richard Levy seek to remedy the
indeterminacy of arbitrariness review in a 1995 article by fashioning
more determinate "craft norms" through which to better restrain
reviewing judges.' In furtherance of these new craft norms,
Professors Shapiro and Levy suggest an amendment to section 706 of
the APA that would shift arbitrary and capricious review toward a
collection of more "specific inquiries."' The specific inquiries are
borrowed from the Court's statement of the arbitrariness standard in
State Farm, and thus include only a relatively small portion of the
conduct considered by deconstruction.6 2 Moreover, Professors
Shapiro and Levy do not explore the theoretical distinctions among
those inquiries or their normative ramifications, both of which are
primary concerns of deconstruction.
Finally, Professor Cass Sunstein's 1983 article in the wake of
State Farm describes hard look review as having "both procedural and
substantive components." 63 He breaks down the procedural aspects of
hard look review into four "central requirements"-requirements to
offer detailed explanations, justify departures from past practices,
allow effective participation by affected interests, and consider
possible alternatives-and defines the substantive aspect as the
"willingness to overturn decisions that appear unjustified."'
Although these components share some overlap with those
considered here, they are not coextensive; Professor Sunstein focuses
on the requirements courts put on agencies through hard look review,
while deconstruction focuses on the individual steps involved in
agency policymaking. Moreover, while Professor Sunstein explains
how the State Farm Court "ratifie[d] the major elements" of hard
look review in its decision, he does not evaluate those elements (or
hard look review more broadly) either theoretically or normatively.6 5
The crux of his analysis is to highlight a shift in the nature of
administrative law from principles of private to public law, and as
59. See id.
60. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 1052.
61. Id. at 1073-74.
62. See id. at 1075.
63. Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REv.
177, 181.
64. Id. at 181-83.
65. Id. at 213.
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such, the analysis is notably distinct from the present discussion of
deconstruction.?
In sum, neither the scholarly literature nor the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence has employed the perspective on hard look review
offered by deconstruction. This new approach distinguishes among
the different facets of agency policymaking in pursuit of a more
consistent, effective, and comprehensible form of arbitrary and
capricious review. It better describes the multivariable nature of hard
look review, while at the same time creating a new typology designed
to promote judicial integrity and administrative confidence in the
viability of agency policy decisions.
II. DECONSTRUCTING ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW
The Supreme Court's difficulty (or disinterest) in developing a
unified theory of arbitrary and capricious review-especially after its
adoption of the hard look doctrine-calls for a more detailed
examination of judicial deference to agency policymaking.
Deconstruction answers this call by applying hard look review to each
individual aspect of the policymaking process. Deconstruction unveils
a subset of more pointed and fundamental inquiries within arbitrary
and capricious review that courts may use to better effectuate their
role as a check on agency activity while simultaneously promoting
notions of administrative effectiveness and legitimacy." These
66. See id. at 177 (stating that recent court decisions "reflect a shift in the underlying
premises of administrative law, a shift that appears to be leading, for the first time, to a
public law divorced from traditional principles of private law").
67. It is worth mentioning that deconstruction does not conflict with the formidable
scholarship questioning whether the different standards of review in administrative law
are in fact very different, either in theory or practice. This is a more common feature of
scholarship examining the relationship between the Chevron doctrine and hard look
review, and Professor Ronald Levin has made perhaps the most convincing case that hard
look review is in fact indistinguishable from review under step two of Chevron-the
judicial determination of whether an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous
statutory language was reasonable. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step
Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254-55 (1997) (arguing that the standard
applied in step two of the Chevron test is indistinguishable from arbitrariness review under
the APA); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (stating what is now referred to as the Chevron two-step process for
reviewing an agency's action). On a broader scale, Professor David Zaring reviewed the
empirical literature regarding whether different standards of review affect judicial
outcomes and concluded that a single reasonableness standard would offer the same
outcomes at a far lower transaction cost. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA.
L. REV. 135, 135 (2010). On first glance, it may appear that a project like deconstruction
would fly in the face of Professors Levin's and Zaring's conclusions about the utility in
consolidating judicial review doctrines. In fact, however, deconstruction is entirely
consistent with (or at least unaffected by) the prospect of consolidation. Deconstruction
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inquiries can be divided most broadly into what this Article refers to
as "first-order" and "second-order" grounds for review. Exploring the
first-order grounds of record building, reason giving, input quality,
and research scope, and the second-order grounds of relevant factors
and rational connection, is the initial step toward adequately
understanding the multidimensional nature of hard look review.
The first-order bases for arbitrariness focus on agencies' modes
of self-education and information gathering. First-order agency
conduct operates as a threshold or prerequisite to administrative
policymaking, and as such it is farther removed from affecting the
content of a final policy determination than second-order conduct.
For instance, in the environmental risk assessment context, an agency
must initially build an adequate record for review, acquire reliable
scientific inputs, and determine the scope of technical information
needed to perform its analysis.' It must then publicly explain its
conclusion."9 While each of these steps is of course relevant to the
final decision as to whether and how closely to regulate discharge of a
pollutant, for example, they are each attenuated (albeit to different
degrees) from the value judgments animating that determination. In
the absence of any of the above first-order activities, an agency could
still reach a conclusion about the appropriate degree of regulation
that would rationally serve the public interest."
does not change or complicate the applicable standard of review of agency policymaking.
It only delineates among the various categories of agency activity in order to allow for
better application of whatever standard is to be applied. So if Chevron step two collapses
into hard look review or hard look review collapses into a broader reasonableness
standard, deconstruction will serve the same purpose within that new standard: to
empower courts to better perform and understand their review of administrative agencies
by dividing agency conduct into its theoretically distinct parts. See Ronald M. Levin, Hard
Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REv. 555, 574-75 (2011)
("I would argue in favor of the utility of doctrines that define the breadth of review.
Clarity about what bases the agency needs to have touched should facilitate the courts'
decisional process . . . .").
68. Risk Assessment: Basic Information, EPA.GOV, http://epa.gov/riskassessment
/basicinformation.htm#arisk (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
69. See id.
70. The most troubling of these first-order categories is likely to be input quality. At
first glance, it may appear that a reasonable or defensible conclusion cannot be reached
without reliable scientific support. There are two reasons why this is not necessarily so,
and thus why data quality is included in the category of first-order agency considerations.
The first is that unreliable data are not necessarily incorrect; even data that were collected
outside the bounds of accepted scientific norms could provide information that in fact
guides the agency toward a defensible conclusion. Second is that scientific inputs may be
only one of many relevant factors to inform a policy analysis, and as such even reliance on
misleading, unreliable data may not affect the ultimate policy outcome in a given case.
That said, an argument could certainly be made for thinking of input quality as a second-
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The second-order components of hard look review include the
agency's choice of relevant factors to influence its final policy
conclusion and the relationship between that conclusion and the
agency's supporting rationale. These second-order considerations are
distinct from their first-order counterparts because they are more
closely connected with the value judgment exercised by the agency,
and thus they are subject to a different set of normative and
institutional concerns under hard look review." This initial division of
arbitrariness review into first- and second-order components serves a
purpose on its own, as it invites a conversation about the relative
justifications for reviewing courts to treat some of the threshold or
prerequisite issues associated with agency policymaking differently
from the agency's ultimate policy conclusions. It also acts as a useful
entr6e into a more detailed review of the narrower forms of hard look
review available to the courts.
It is worth noting at this point that the division of arbitrary and
capricious review into these various subparts is necessarily inexact.
There is certainly room for debate about whether certain agency
decisions are in fact a first- or second-order question. It is entirely
possible that in some circumstances what may appear theoretically to
be a first-order, threshold question of administrative record building
may have such a direct and significant effect on the content of the
final policy decision that it is better described as a second-order
consideration. For instance, many agencies gather data and perform
analyses to predict the likely consequences of a policy before enacting
it. On the one hand, collecting predictive data fits nicely as first-order
conduct due to its focus on agency self-education. Conversely, the
predictive data could be the driving factor (or reason) behind the
agency's ultimate policy conclusion, making it appear far more like a
second-order issue. While this difficulty is important to keep in mind
throughout the deconstruction process and is dealt with in more detail
later, it is not inconsistent with the ultimate goal of the project,
namely to identify and theoretically distinguish various approaches to
hard look review.
Put another way, deconstruction is not meant to operate as a
rigid set of rules to prescribe the outcome of judicial review in every
case. There are good reasons to grant judges latitude in their review
order issue. Even in those circumstances, deconstruction is a useful exercise, as it does not
ultimately depend upon rigid classification of different modes of agency conduct, as much
as the theoretical distinctions among them. See discussion infra Part II.A.3 (describing in
greater detail the first-order category of input quality).
71. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
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of agency conduct, even within a categorical framework like
deconstruction. The ultimate goal of deconstruction is thus to
highlight the theoretical distinctions among the various steps taken by
agencies in formulating policy in order to open additional space for
normative considerations about the appropriate measure of deference
in specific cases. This is accomplished even where courts disagree as
to which categories are implicated in a given case. As Professor
Ronald Levin argued nearly twenty years ago:
Whether to maintain a particular set of categories [of judicial
review] should depend heavily on whether the distinction
underlying them is valid: Does the agency deserve deference
more in one case than in the other? An affirmative answer
constitutes a strong argument for preserving the distinction,
even though judges may have room to maneuver if the
application of the distinction is not self-evident. Sometimes our
main concern is that the law be "settled"; at other times we
prefer that it be "settled right." Therefore, at least until we
have had enough experience with a given standard of review to
say that it has proved its worth in the precise form in which it is
couched, courts should at least be open to considering whether
refinements and exceptions to it are warranted.72
Deconstruction offers precisely the types of "valid" (albeit novel)
distinctions that Professor Levin suggests should be preserved
without denying courts the latitude necessary to ensure that, with
experience, the law will be "settled right.""
Regardless of whether each of the proposed categories is best
described as first-order, second-order, or some combination of the
two, the fact that they are theoretically distinct offers a valuable
opportunity for normative consideration of each. This normative
perspective in turn permits a more sophisticated valuation of the
optimal use of arbitrariness review in a variety of administrative
contexts.
A. First-Order Review
Reviewing an agency's first-order determinations dates back at
least to the Supreme Court's decision in Overton Park.74 Since that
72. Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of Certainty on
Appeal, 44 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1091 (1995) (responding to Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10).
73. See id.
74. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971)




time, the Court has advanced several different conceptions of first-
order arbitrariness, from the complete lack of stated reasons in
support of a decision to the failure to develop an adequate record
upon which to base judicial review.75 The Court has not, however,
offered a theoretical framework for its treatment of such perceived
shortcomings. The Court also has failed to define the entire range of
potential shortcomings that could (or should) lead to a finding of
arbitrary agency action.
1. Record Building
The process of developing an administrative record sufficient to
facilitate judicial review is a well-known feature of arbitrary and
capricious review,7 6 and for good reason. Courts cannot perform their
constitutionally required duty of ensuring that agencies act within
permissible political and legal bounds without an account of how the
agency in fact conducted itself. As a result, the existence of a
complete administrative record is a necessary component of any
defensible agency action and, conversely, the absence of such a record
counsels in favor of a finding that the agency acted arbitrarily.
Perhaps the most obvious example of this mode of review is Overton
Park, where the Court ordered reconsideration of the Secretary of
Transportation's decision on the "full administrative record" and
75. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983) (finding arbitrariness because the Agency "apparently gave no
consideration whatever" to the viability of an airbags-only requirement); Overton Park,
401 U.S. at 420 (explaining that judicial review of an agency's decision must be "based on
the full administrative record that was before the [agency]" at the time of the decision, and
that if the record is not sufficiently developed to permit such a review, "it may be
necessary for the District Court to require some explanation").
76. See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) ("At most, Overton Park suggests that [the APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard] imposes a general 'procedural' requirement of sorts by
mandating that an agency take whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will
enable the court to evaluate the agency's rationale .... "); see also Janet C. Hoeffel,
Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46
B.C. L. REV. 771, 793 (2005) ("In order to expose arbitrary decision making, we need a
record. In administrative law, there is a built-in procedure for reviewing an agency's
decision for 'arbitrary and capricious' decisions: the decisionmaker must make a complete
and thorough record of the reasons for the decision."). The circuit courts have confirmed
the importance of developing a record for arbitrary and capricious review. See, e.g.,
Kathryn J. Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural Rules of Pursuing an
ERISA Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REV. 329, 380 & n.266 (2001) ("In cases where the
arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable, virtually all the circuits limit the evidence
presented at court to that contained in the administrative record." (citations omitted)).
77. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
2014] 741
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
suggested that if such a record did not exist, the district court could
exercise its authority to ensure that one was created.78
In cases where an administrative record exists but is allegedly
incomplete or unsatisfactory, a more detailed inquiry may be
required. The Court employed such an analysis in Bowman
Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 79 Arkansas-
Best involved a challenge to the Interstate Commerce Commission's
("ICC") issuance of new certificates of public convenience for
transportation companies seeking to operate on routes already
utilized by existing certificate holders."o One of the issues raised
before the district court was whether the administrative record should
be reopened due to the five-year time lapse between the close of the
ICC's evidentiary hearings and the Agency's final decision."' Even
though it was "unclear" whether the district court independently
relied on the state of the administrative record in setting aside the
Commission's order," the Supreme Court nonetheless considered the
completeness and adequacy of the record sufficiently important to
warrant attention.
The following first-order criteria in this Section address some-if
not all-of the remaining examples of how perceived weaknesses in
the administrative record manifest themselves upon hard look review.
For present purposes, therefore, it is sufficient to note that the
complete lack of an administrative record (or some material portion
thereof)" may be grounds for a ruling that the accompanying agency
action is arbitrary and that other more nuanced infirmities in the
record may serve as independent bases for finding that agency action
fails hard look review.
78. Id.; see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43-44 ("[lIt is also relevant that Congress
required a record of the rulemaking proceedings to be compiled and submitted to a
reviewing court. . . .").
79. 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
80. See id. at 281.
81. Id. at 294.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 294-300 (concluding "that there is sound basis for adhering to our
practice of declining to require reopening of the record, except in the most extraordinary
circumstances").
84. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("When the basis for a proposed rule is a scientific decision, the scientific
material which is believed to support the rule should be exposed to the view of interested
parties for their comment.").
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2. Reason Giving
Reason giving is a well-known and widely discussed feature of
legitimate administrative action. Numerous commentators have cited
the importance of agencies offering public explanations for their
decisions as a way of promoting substantive rationality as well as
public accountability and transparency. 5 Because agencies occupy a
somewhat insulated place in our constitutional democracy, it is crucial
for their democratic legitimacy that they appear constrained by
rationality and, at least indirectly, our elected officials." One way to
protect against irrational, unchecked agency action is to require that
the agency explain itself. While the simple existence of reasons
cannot ensure that an agency reached a rational conclusion, it can
ensure that irrational or unsupported conclusions will be more readily
identified and addressed by all three branches of government and the
public. Courts and commentators generally agree and have spent
significant time and energy exploring the theoretical bases for
requiring agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their
decisions." On this basis, reason giving is among the least interesting
of the categories in deconstructed arbitrary and capricious review.
85. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 485 (2002) ("[Administrative law
principles] require agencies in general to articulate a basis for their policy determinations
and, in particular, to articulate the standards for those determinations."); Cary Coglianese
& Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2004) (arguing that "[aJdministrative law aspires to bring
reason to agency policymaking" by "requir[ing] agencies to specify the basis for the rules
they promulgate"); Lawson, supra note 58, at 315 ("Well-settled principles of
administrative review plainly require agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their
legal interpretations .... "); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar:
Reasons and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 24 (2001)
(addressing the legitimacy of the administrative state through the role of reason giving);
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (1995) (discussing reason
giving as a part of administrative and judicial decision making).
86. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) ("From the birth of the
administrative state, we have struggled to describe our regulatory government as the
legitimate child of a constitutional democracy. That is, we have sought to reconcile the
administrative state with a constitutional structure that reserves important policy decisions
for elected officials and not for appointed bureaucrats."); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent
of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987,
987 (1997) ("The nature of our attempts to solve the problem-that is, to reconcile the
reality of regulatory government in the United States with the ideals of American
constitutional democracy-has varied with the times.").
87. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (finding the Agency's decision impermissibly arbitrary because the
"agency submitted no reasons at all" for its decision); supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
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What does make it interesting, however, is that reason giving can
be further subdivided into first- and second-order components. This
subdivision of administrative reason giving opens up the possibility of
comparing and contrasting the normative bases for requiring agencies
to supply any reasons at all-first-order reason giving-with those for
offering reasons that provide persuasive support for the ultimate
policy decision-second-order reason giving. Both modes of reason
giving are discussed as part of the Supreme Court's conclusion in
State Farm." In deciding that the Agency arbitrarily failed to consider
an airbags-only standard after determining that an airbags-or-passive
seatbelt standard would not be effective, the Court explained that the
Agency failed because it "submitted no reasons at all."" This was a
first-order failure by the Agency; it did not necessarily represent a
flaw in the Agency's ultimate policy judgment to abandon the new
safety standard, but rather it represented a flaw in its ability to meet
the necessary prerequisites for exercising that judgment.
By contrast, the State Farm Court's rejection of the NHTSA's
decision to abandon automatic seatbelts was based on second-order
reason giving. The Agency had articulated some reasons for its
decision, so there was no first-order problem of failing to provide any
explanation for its conduct. The Court instead took issue with the
quality of the NHTSA's explanation, holding that the reasons that
were proffered by the Agency did not create the necessary "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made."90 This
second-order analysis directly implicates the final policy choice by the
Agency and is synonymous with the rational connection category
discussed below." At this stage in the analysis, it is enough to show
that although first- and second-order reason giving are clearly related,
they are potentially distinct when considered in light of broader
principles of judicial deference to agency decision making.'
Disaggregating them opens up a more dynamic treatment of
arbitrariness review that could lead to additional insights into how
such review best fits within our administrative system.
88. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50, 56.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Id. at 52, 56 (citation omitted).
91. For a thorough discussion of rational connection review (or second-order reason
giving), see infra Part II.B.2.
92. For a detailed discussion of two core principles of judicial deference to
administrative agencies-agency expertise and political accountability-see infra Part
III.A.1.
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3. Input Quality
Another first-order issue that arises in agency decision making,
especially in decisions involving scientific or technical information, is
whether an agency had processes in place to ensure the reliability or
veracity of the informational inputs to its policy decisions.9 3 Reliable
inputs serve at least two important functions in the administrative
process. They provide substantive information that is relevant and
helpful to policymakers, and they create a rational basis from which
administrators may justify their policy determinations. 94 The
exclusion of unreliable information, however, may be even more
important. Whereas a lack of reliable inputs does not necessarily
destroy an agency's ability to make a principled decision,95 the
introduction of unreliable information might. Unreliable information
could cause agencies to make poorly informed policy decisions or,
more cynically, to "manufacture uncertainty" 96 or otherwise
mischaracterize those inputs in support of a policy decision that is not
in fact supported by the data.97 This in turn creates significant
93. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan.
14, 2005) (mandating independent peer review for all important scientific information
disseminated by administrative agencies). Like its predecessor policies at individual
agencies, the mandate was somewhat open-ended, leaving the form and scope of peer
review to the agencies' discretion, noting that "[p]eer review may take a variety of forms."
Id. at 2665 ("We recognize that different types of peer review are appropriate for different
types of information. Under this Bulletin, agencies are granted broad discretion to weigh
the benefits and costs of using a particular peer review mechanism for a specific
information product.").
94. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (requiring new rules
to include a "concise general statement of their basis and purpose"); Mashaw, supra note
85, at 24-25 (recounting the development of the "concise statement" requirement of
section 553(c) of the APA "into the requirement of a comprehensive articulation of the
factual bases, methodological presuppositions, and statutory authority that justifies any
exercise of rulemaking").
95. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009) ("There are
some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled . . .. It is one thing
to set aside agency action ... because of failure to adduce empirical data that can readily
be obtained. It is something else to insist upon obtaining the unobtainable." (internal
citation omitted)).
96. Professor David Michaels, the Energy Department's former Assistant Secretary
for Environment, Safety, and Health under President Clinton, defined "manufacturing
uncertainty" as "reanalyz[ing] the data to make [previously firm] conclusions disappear-
poof. Then they say one study says yes and the other says no, so we're nowhere." Rick
Weiss, 'Data Quality' Law is Nemesis of Regulation, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2004, at Al;
see also Gardiner Harris, White House is Accused of Putting Politics Over Science, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007//07/10/washington/11cnd-surgeon
.html?pagewanted=print&jr=2& (identifying areas in which scientific information became
politicized).
97. This is analogous to Professor J.B. Ruhl's "The Science Made Us Do It" violation.
See J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of Virtue: Maxims for the Co-Evolution of
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systemic problems, including possibly rendering the agency's conduct
arbitrary.
Courts' role in ensuring input quality, however, is another
matter. Examples involving judicial review of the effect of unreliable
information in the administrative process are difficult to come by, as
courts are loath to second-guess agencies' scientific conclusions.98
Moreover, as Professor Wendy Wagner has demonstrated, agency use
of flawed scientific information is extremely rare.99 Finally, the
approach most often associated with judicial judgments about agency
science-and generally described in the academic literature as
"regulatory Daubert"'"-has been widely criticized.o Regulatory
Environmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENVTL. L. 1063, 1067-68 (2007). The
opposite problem, that of using unreliable scientific information to "manufacture
certainty," is less of a concern as it depends on the total absence of reliable scientific
information rather than merely the presence of a single source of unreliable information
as in the case of manufacturing uncertainty.
98. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and
Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011)
(describing the judiciary's tendency to defer more strongly to agency scientific
determinations as "super deference"). There are, however, examples outside of the
judicial review process that indicate that an agency relying on bad science is not an
impossibility. The application of established agency use of "bad science" is evident in the
EPA's 2003 decision not to promulgate additional regulations regarding the weed killer
atrazine. See Weiss, supra note 96 (explaining that in the same month that the European
Union banned atrazine, "the EPA decided to permit ongoing use in the United States with
no new restrictions"). Just prior to the EPA's decision, the European Union had decided
to ban atrazine on the basis of scientific evidence demonstrating that atrazine caused
dangerous hormonal changes in wildlife. See id. (noting that the harmful effects of atrazine
"have been echoed by at least four other independent research teams in three countries").
The EPA, however, pointed to scientific uncertainty about the potential dangers of
atrazine as the basis for its regulatory inaction. Id. (listing the scientific grounds on which
further regulation of atrazine was challenged). The cause of this uncertainty was scientific
data supporting atrazine's safety that came from studies funded by atrazine's
manufacturer, Syngenta, and later deemed fundamentally flawed by the EPA's Scientific
Advisory Panel. Id. ("A special EPA science panel would eventually level stinging
criticisms at [Syngenta's] studies for their poor design and sloppy implementation."). The
result was an administrative process that may not only have been informed by unreliable
science, but was also accused of "manufacturing [scientific] uncertainty" in order to justify
a predetermined policy position. Id. (quoting Professor David Michaels).
99. See Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the
Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 63, 72 ("[D]espite the thousands of public health and safety
regulations promulgated annually, there are surprisingly few examples of EPA using
unreliable science or using science inappropriately to support a final regulation."
(footnotes omitted)); see also SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE
ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 3-4, 20-38 (1990) (noting that most criticisms of agency
science "had relatively little to do with the competence or incompetence of agency
officials").
100. See Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert": A Proposal
to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles Into
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Daubert seeks to apply the gatekeeping principles of the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." to
judicial review of agency scientific determinations.'0 3 In Daubert, the
Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 required courts to
judge the reliability and relevance of scientific information proposed
to be admitted as evidence at trial.'" Notwithstanding the differences
between evidentiary determinations and hard look review, regulatory
Daubert proposes a similar form of judicial review in the
administrative context."0o This is problematic, as Professor Thomas
McGarity and others point out, due to the wide gap in institutional
competency between agencies and courts: generalist courts are simply
not qualified to judge the technical determinations of expert
106agencies.
These valid criticisms of the judiciary's ability to review the
quality of agency science, however, do not eliminate the potential
value of input quality to deconstruction. As an initial matter, the
introduction of the input quality category is not meant as an
affirmative claim that courts should attempt to judge the
"correctness" or reliability of agency science as part of their hard look
review. Rather, it suggests that if they did, it would be a decidedly
different inquiry than, for instance, a review of whether the agency
provided reasons for its ultimate policy position. The theoretical
distinctions between modes of review are important independent of
the inherent value or utility of those individual modes, even when
courts are reluctant to review one of the categories altogether.
Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 7, 8, 39 (defining
"regulatory Daubert" as a "conceptual framework" that allows judges to inquire into
"agency science and related administrative justifications for regulatory action").
101. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, On the Prospect of "Daubertizing" Judicial Review
of Risk Assessment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 155, 156, 171 (stating
that "judicial adoption of regulatory Daubert will likely result in unconstrained regulatory
policymaking by unaccountable and scientifically illiterate judges and in a much higher
incidence of judicial remand of important regulations").
102. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
103. See Raul & Dwyer, supra note 100, at 39 (explaining how "regulatory Daubert"
would apply to judicial review of an agency's scientific determinations).
104. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. Rule 702 was amended after Daubert to reflect the
Court's decision. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (advisory committee's note).
105. See, e.g., Raul & Dwyer, supra note 100, at 20-27 (discussing the application of
Daubert principles to judicial review of administrative agencies).
106. See McGarity, supra note 101, at 156 ("Judges' limited competence in areas
involving scientific data and analysis, complex modeling exercises, and large uncertainties
is well recognized in administrative law and has been effectively demonstrated by the
courts themselves in post-Daubert toxic torts opinions."); see also Wagner, supra note 99,
at 97 ("[I]f the courts' scientific competency is less than that of the party they are
reviewing, it is unclear what the courts are contributing to the exercise.").
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Professor Emily Hammond's work on judicial review of agency
science describes the phenomenon of "super-deference," by which
courts defer more strongly to agency scientific determinations than to
other policy-related conclusions.107 At first glance, it may appear that
the concept of super-deference renders input quality review, at least
of scientific information, effectively moot. This point is debatable for
the reasons articulated below,"os but at minimum, input quality review
has value as a comparative tool to provide greater clarity and
integrity to hard look review in general. As Professor Hammond
notes, many claims of bad agency science are better described as
examples of inadequate agency reasoning.109 By singling out input
quality as an individual category of hard look review, courts are
encouraged to delineate between input quality and reasoning and to
pay closer attention to the normative bases for review in each distinct
context. This provides a benefit to hard look review regardless of
whether input quality is itself frequently employed by the courts.1 o
Moreover, there are several ways in which courts may refine
their consideration of input quality that could either eliminate or
greatly reduce the impact of their lack of technical expertise. Rather
than focusing on the accuracy or reliability of specific data points,
judges could focus on broader questions such as the qualifications and
independence of the information's source (particularly where
agencies rely on outside studies for their data), whether an agency
considered and responded to significant public comments, or whether
it employed methodological protections such as peer review in its
data acquisition."' Although these inquiries are not wholly non-
107. See Meazell, supra note 98, at 734.
108. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
109. See Meazell, supra note 98, at 749 & n.83.
110. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
111. See Louis J. Virelli III, Scientific Peer Review and Administrative Legitimacy, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 732-40 (2009) (defining administrative peer review and outlining its
benefits for agency science). A possible concern regarding judicial reliance on peer review
is that agencies are often forced to make technically related policy decisions before
relevant scientific opinion is settled, such that relying on peer review as indicia of
reliability conflates the standards of scientific publication with those of valuable scientific
inputs to the administrative process. While it is certainly true that agencies operate under
many more restraints in their use of scientific information than academic scientists, see id.
at 737-38, it does not alter the positive value of peer review to courts seeking to
understand the reliability of a given agency input. Peer-reviewed support carries with it
the imprimatur of reliability, regardless of whether the converse is true; the lack of peer-
reviewed support is not the opposite of reliability, but it is an indication that the
information at issue has not been vetted by the scientific community, and as such requires
some other indicia of its reliability. In either case, keeping peer review in mind as a useful
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technical, they are sufficiently general and sufficiently procedural
such that they transcend technical subject matter and thus are more
likely to be within judicial competence than review of the
"correctness" of agency science.
Lastly, input quality is not limited to scientific or technical
information. The reliability of nontechnical relevant inputs is equally
important to the administrative process and is far more likely to be
within the normal competence of the courts. For nontechnical inputs,
courts could inquire into whether an agency gathered information
from known and reputable sources or through methods recognized as
reliable by professional organizations or in other areas of the law." 2
Neither of these inquiries requires any specific technical expertise, yet
each could be a valuable means of protecting the veracity or
reliability of the administrative record.
Judicial review of an agency's procedures for ensuring input
reliability could be a useful way to evaluate whether that agency had
acted arbitrarily in making a policy decision based on those inputs.
The possibility of an agency employing unreliable or false
information in its policymaking arguably renders the entire decision-
making process arbitrary, and as such, courts should include within
their arbitrariness review an agency's procedures for admitting
reliable inputs and excluding unreliable ones.
Despite a seemingly direct connection between reliability and
rational decision making, the Supreme Court has never explicitly
looked into input quality as part of its arbitrary and capricious review.
Rather than use this fact as a reason to disregard arbitrariness review
of data quality, it should instead be thought of as a strong justification
for deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review to reveal additional
bases upon which courts can and should focus their attention.
signal of information quality can prove helpful, even if not dispositive, for reviewing
courts.
112. Acquiring information about a specific place or event, for instance, may be better
done through first-hand observations by agency personnel, other eyewitness accounts, or
some form of adversarial fact-finding rather than via third-party statements and hearsay.
This concept for judicial treatment of nontechnical inputs is mirrored in the Court's
decision in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999). Kumho Tire
was a successor to Daubert and thus carries with it the same precautionary notes discussed
above with regard to strict application of Daubert in the regulatory context. See supra
notes 100-06 and accompanying text. It nevertheless reflects the idea expressed here that
courts can evaluate (at least in meaningful part) the reliability of nonscientific agency
inputs without claiming to share the agency's expertise.
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4. Research Scope
A related inquiry into first-order agency activity addresses the
breadth of information that agencies consider in their policymaking.
In addition to focusing on the quality of information brought into the
process, the number and range of information sources could also have
a significant impact on arbitrariness. Imagine a scenario where an
agency gathers a single, reliable study or data source to inform a
policy decision. The quality of the relevant information is not
implicated in this instance, but that does not mean that the agency's
procedures are not arbitrary in another dimension. It is not only
possible but likely, given the complexity and controversial nature of
many of the problems facing agencies, that several reliable and
potentially conflicting inputs may be germane to a single issue before
an agency.
Perhaps more importantly, inclusion of the proper range of
information is reflective of the agency's due diligence in
policymaking, which is important for ensuring both that the agency is
properly informed and that the public sees its administrative
institutions engaging in thorough, rigorous analyses. An agency's
failure to incorporate an adequate range of information on a
particular subject thus forms an independent ground for a finding of
arbitrariness and should be treated accordingly by courts during hard
look review.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the relevance of research
scope to hard look review in Fox Television. The Court held that a
change in the FCC's policy restricting the use of "fleeting expletives"
on television was not arbitrary or capricious, at least in part based on
the Court's determination that the Agency acted rationally in
concluding that such expletives could be harmful to children.113 The
court of appeals had stated that the FCC's policy change could not be
upheld without evidence suggesting that fleeting expletives do in fact
cause serious enough harm to children to warrant government
intervention."4 The Court rejected that line of reasoning, explaining
that the effect of broadcast profanity on children is not something
that lends itself to direct empirical study, and thus the other
information available to the Agency-such as children's propensity to
113. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 517-18 (2009).
114. See id. at 519 ("In the [appellate court] majority's view, without 'evidence that
suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful' . . the agency could not regulate more broadly.").
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mimic observed behavior-constituted a sufficient knowledge base to
support the new policy.115
There are several ways to view the Court's decision in Fox
Television, and this vantage point is admittedly a narrow one.'16 It is
nevertheless useful to deconstruction because it provides evidence
that the Court does consider research scope as a meaningful part of
administrative policymaking. The range of information discussed by
the Fox Television Court all pertained to the effect of profanity on
children. The Court concluded that the Agency did not need to
expand its research scope to include empirical data because it had
sufficient information to conduct a rational analysis."' This may well
be a controversial position, but regardless of whether the Court was
right in its determination about the scope of the Agency's
investigation, the very fact that it undertook the inquiry is enough to
demonstrate deconstruction's potential usefulness.
The research scope consideration introduced here is distinct from
the "relevant factors" analysis frequently referred to by courts and
described below." The question of whether an agency has considered
all of the factors relevant to a given policy question can be thought of
in at least two ways, neither of which are necessarily coextensive with
the scope of data collected by the agency. As an initial matter, the
relevant factors to a policy question can be thought of as a statutory
question whereby Congress has outlined the factors to be accounted
for by an agency, and the agency's failure to account for these factors
would render its decision "arbitrary ... or not in accordance with
law" under the APA. 119 Another manifestation of the relevant factors
standard is an agency's failure-in the absence of congressional
guidelines-to properly identify the list of factors that are
substantively relevant to its final determination. This second version
of the relevant factors analysis could involve both under- and over-
inclusive approaches by the agency, for example by including
115. See id. ("[I]t suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they observe
116. See, e.g., id. at 505 (referring to the statutory language proscribing "any ...
indecent ... language" as support for the FCC's new policy position). This does not take
away from the relevance of the agency's research scope to hard look review generally, but
it does demonstrate the complexity of such review and the apparent difficulty experienced
by the Court in articulating a consistent, coherent framework for explaining its reasoning
in such cases. Deconstruction will help to alleviate this difficulty.
117. See id. at 519 (finding that empirical data demonstrating how one-word indecent
expletives would constitute harm to children were not required because knowing children
mimic others' behavior is sufficient).
118. See infra Part II.B.1.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
2014] 751
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
economic considerations where they are either germane or inapposite
to the ultimate policy question. 120
By contrast, the research scope variable asks about the range of
data collected by an agency in connection with its policy
determination. The scope of an agency's research could be measured
within a single relevant factor, for instance where an agency has
considered only one source of statistical evidence pertaining to an
issue when multiple credible sources are available. It could also be
measured across several factors, where the full range of data sources
are collected for one of the relevant factors, but not for others. In
either case, an agency's failure to incorporate a more inclusive
universe of relevant data is a separate and distinct basis for a finding
of arbitrariness that merits individual attention.
For similar reasons, research scope is also best thought of as a
first-order consideration. To focus on the breadth of information
gathered by the agency is to focus on the agency's diligence in
preparing itself to make its policy judgment. Whether all or most of
the relevant information is brought before the agency does not dictate
answers to second-order questions of whether it contemplated all of
the relevant factors or made a rational connection between the
available information and its ultimate policy position. Research scope
is thus-at least conceptually-a threshold consideration in an
agency's policy judgments. That is not to say that research scope is
entirely divorced from the final outcome, is not related to questions
of agency rationality or integrity, or is otherwise unimportant to
agency practice. It is simply to recognize a further theoretical
distinction that could be useful to courts and commentators seeking
to ask more probing questions about the efficacy of hard look review.
These examples of first-order criteria for courts to consider
during hard look review-record building, reason giving, input
quality, and research scope-are not meant to be exhaustive or
necessarily novel; while input quality would be a novel consideration
in arbitrary and capricious review, reason giving, for instance, would
not. The purpose of this exercise is instead to identify some
distinctions that could make hard look review more principled,
effective, and democratically legitimate.
120. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222 (2009) (holding that
the EPA was permitted to consider costs as a relevant factor in its regulation of cooling-




Arbitrary and capricious review also takes account of the second-
order features of agency action. Second-order arbitrariness review is a
more amorphous category than first-order review, primarily because
the range of policy issues that arise before agencies and reviewing
courts is so widely varied. In order to meaningfully theorize these
second-order features of hard look review, it is therefore necessary to
describe the relevant questions asked by courts in rather broad
strokes.
1. Relevant Factors
One key manifestation of second-order arbitrariness review is an
examination of the number and nature of "relevant factors"
considered by an agency in reaching its policy decision.12' As
Professor Richard Pierce recently explained, "[ilt is hard to imagine
any administrative law issue more basic than identifying the factors
that an agency must, can, and cannot consider in making a
decision." 122 Relevant factors analysis is a prominent feature of hard
look review.123 It helps agencies make thoughtful choices based on a
thorough understanding of all aspects of their decisions.124
Perhaps more importantly, the relevant factors analysis occupies
a particularly powerful position in the overall arc of agency decision
making; it acts as a potential bridge between what are described here
as first-order activities of information gathering and the agency's
ultimate policy determinations. The former are precursors to the
relevant factors analysis. They go to the quality of the available policy
inputs, regardless of whether those inputs are directly relevant to a
policy question or whether the agency has identified all of the issues
associated with that question. The latter, by contrast, is a potential
product of the relevant factors determination. Before an agency
offers its explanation for why the administrative record rationally
supports its ultimate determination it must, either explicitly or
121. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) ("In reviewing [an agency's] explanation, we must 'consider whether the
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors .... ' (quoting Bowman
Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)).
122. Pierce, supra note 51, at 67.
123. See id. (explaining that the question of which factors are relevant to an agency's
decision is something "[elvery agency must confront ... every day, and circuit courts
address it on a regular basis").
124. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42-43 (explaining that courts must examine the
relevant factors within an "arbitrary and capricious" analysis).
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implicitly, make choices as to which factors are significant enough to
be treated as influential components in that determination. Those
choices qualify as second-order considerations under the present
definition because they involve policy judgments by the agency that
have a direct impact on the content of the agency's final position.12 5
By virtue of its key role in the policymaking process, relevant factors
analysis merits the separate consideration within arbitrary and
capricious review offered by deconstruction.
The Supreme Court apparently agrees. There are two contexts in
which a relevant factors analysis can take place. The first occurs when
factors are provided by statute,'126 requiring the reviewing court to ask
whether the factors actually relied on by the agency comport with
those in the statute.127 The second involves congressional silence
125. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (defining first- and second-order
considerations). There is the possibility that a "statutory" relevant factors analysis could
appear to be more of a first-order than a second-order question. If the statutory analysis is
thought of first and foremost as a "box-checking" exercise, where an agency is merely
required to say that it considered certain statutorily defined factors to successfully justify
its policy conclusion, then it would appear more like a first-order consideration. There are
at least two possible problems with this perspective. First, it is unclear whether the Court
would consider such a cursory statement as satisfying a relevant factors analysis under its
current arbitrary and capricious jurisprudence. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 67-69
(describing the recent fluctuations in the Court's current approach to its relevant factors
analysis). Second, the purpose of the relevant factors inquiry is to promote a better value
judgment by the agency. It seeks to ensure that the agency's final determination is
informed by, and consistent with, all of the relevant issues affecting the subject. In
addition to Congress's relevance determination, which is obviously a substantive decision,
the reviewing court's determination that the agency's ultimate conclusion sufficiently
incorporates the statutory factors fits here as a second-order consideration because it
requires an understanding of both the policy decision itself and the quality of its
underlying rationales.
126. This "statutory" relevant factors analysis can be further divided into two subparts.
The first asks if an agency took all of the statutorily enumerated factors into account in
reaching its decision, and the second asks if an agency included a factor in its analysis that
was statutorily prohibited. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 51 at 67-69. The Court undertook
this first brand of statutory relevant factors review in American Paper Institute, Inc. v.
American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 417-18 (1983) (concluding that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's decision incorporated all of the relevant
statutory factors), and the second brand of statutory factors review in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468, (2001) (prohibiting the EPA from
considering costs in its air quality standard setting because doing so was deemed precluded
from consideration by section 109(b) of the Clean Air Act).
127. Despite initial appearances, the "statutory" relevant factors analysis is at least
conceptually different from review of the agency's statutory interpretation under Chevron.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Under the relevant factors analysis, courts ask whether the agency's explanation
encompasses the relevant statutorily defined issues, not whether the statute in fact
requires the agency to consider those issues in the first instance (presumably that would be
a matter of law). In cases where the statutory requirements are ambiguous, a statutory
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regarding the relevant factors and asks whether the agency's own
choices regarding which factors to consider satisfy hard look review. 128
Although there is no single method of identifying relevant factors
under this analysis, courts could rely on information like the agency's
policy mission, its own description of its deliberations, and the
cultural and historical role of the agency in drawing out which factors
should be treated as relevant to its final decision.
The Court has considered the relevant factors question often and
in both contexts, 129 although never self-consciously enough or with
sufficient regard for the other categories of agency conduct to achieve
relevant factors analysis could certainly incorporate Chevron principles in answering the
initial question of what exactly the agency is required to consider, and for present
purposes it is assumed that an agency decision in that regard would receive Chevron
deference. It is sufficient here to note that the Chevron analysis needed to establish which
factors are indeed statutorily relevant is independent from the question that is ultimately
subject to arbitrary and capricious review-did the agency's explanation of its policy
decision include information sufficient to satisfy that statutory requirement?
128. There are obvious parallels between this example of hard look review and step
two of Chevron. See id. at 843. In both cases, agencies are left with statutory space in
which to exercise their discretion and are reviewed for their reasonableness or rationality
in that exercise. To the extent these similarities exist, relevant factors considerations in
hard look review may have something to learn from the courts' experience with-and
commentators' far greater focus on-Chevron. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 67, at 1254
(arguing that the standard applied in step two of the Chevron test is indistinguishable from
arbitrariness review under the APA). But see Nat'1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 (2005) (distinguishing between step two of Chevron
and hard look review by noting that an agency's "inconsistency bears on whether the
Commission has given a reasoned explanation for its current position, not on whether its
interpretation is consistent with the statute" under Chevron). In terms of the larger aim of
deconstruction, however, it is unlikely that much can be gained or lost by analogy to
Chevron. Many of the categories of hard look review identified here (especially first-order
considerations like record building) are unlikely to be issues of statutory interpretation in
the first instance, and thus Chevron cannot offer much in terms of the entire range of hard
look review represented by deconstruction or in terms of the comparative lessons to be
learned by thinking of arbitrariness review across those categories. In this way, the process
of deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review offers an additional perspective on how
hard look review may be distinct from Chevron deference. Alternatively, to the extent that
Chevron step two is effectively redundant with arbitrariness review under 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(A)(2), there is no clear reason why deconstruction would not be equally useful in
that context.
129. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) (holding that the EPA
was not arbitrary and capricious, noting that the court of appeals erred in identifying the
EPA's omission of consideration of the river's degraded nature as a relevant factor);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48,
55 (1983) (concluding, inter alia, that the Department of Transportation's decision to
rescind a passive restraint regulation for automobiles was arbitrary and capricious because
it failed to consider two "alternative way[s] of achieving the [safety] objectives of the
Act"); American Paper, 461 U.S. at 417-18 (holding that the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's decision incorporated all of the relevant statutory factors).
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the benefits or insights associated with deconstruction. 30 In American
Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp.,"' the
Court reviewed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
("FERC") decision to apply the "full-avoided-cost" rule to electric
utilities' purchases of electric energy from cogenerators and small
power producers. 13 2 The Court concluded that the Agency's decision
was not arbitrary and capricious because the Agency incorporated the
enumerated statutory factors,133 including the requirement that it be
"just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric utility
and in the public interest."13 4
In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,"' in the
face of congressional silence regarding relevant factors, the Court
upheld an FCC decision regarding local common ownership of
newspapers and broadcast radio or television stations."3 6 The FCC's
decision was challenged, inter alia, as arbitrary and capricious because
it treated existing newspaper-broadcast combinations more favorably
than new ones.137 The court of appeals concluded that the FCC acted
arbitrarily by not favoring diversification of ownership as the primary
factor in its decision."' The Supreme Court rejected the appellate
court's reasoning, explaining that the FCC's interest in the
continuation of quality service and the past performance of
incumbent ownership were both relevant factors in the Agency's
policy determination, and as such, the Agency's decision to include
them in its analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious.'39
Finally, in Judulang v. Holder,40 the Court held that the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") acted arbitrarily in applying the
"comparable grounds" rule to determine if an alien is eligible for
discretionary relief from deportation.14' The Court acknowledged that
130. For a discussion of the normative, institutional, and systemic benefits of
deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review, see infra Part III.
131. 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
132. Id. at 404.
133. See id. at 412-18.
134. Id. at 413 (quoting Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 § 210, 16 U.S.C.
§ 824a-3(b) (Supp. V 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
136. See id. at 779.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 790-91
139. See id. at 805-09. The Court then explained how the Agency's ultimate balance of
those factors was also rational, thereby distinguishing the relevant factors analysis from
the rational connection category discussed infra Part II.B.2. See id. at 814.
140. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
141. Id. at 490. The "comparable grounds" rule "evaluates whether the ground for
deportation charged in a case has a close analogue in the statute's list of exclusion
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the statute was silent with regard to the relevant factors1 42 and
rejected the Government's contention that historical practice and cost
considerations were adequate bases to prohibit an alien from seeking
discretionary relief.143 The Court instead based its arbitrariness ruling
on its own determination of the relevant factors, holding that the
BIA's "action must be based on non-arbitrary, 'relevant factors,'
which here means that the BIA's approach must be tied, even if
loosely, to the purposes of the immigration laws or the appropriate
operation of the immigration system."'"
These widely varying examples of the Court applying the
relevant factors analysis demonstrate its importance to hard look
review. Its pivotal place in the policymaking process between first-
order considerations and the agency's final policy position reinforce
the idea that it is a distinct, highly influential part of that process. As
such, the identification of relevant factors is a category of agency
conduct that courts should consider-within the framework of
deconstruction-as an independent source of potentially arbitrary
agency action.
grounds"; in turn, "[i]f the deportation ground consists of a set of crimes 'substantially
equivalent' to the set of offenses making up an exclusion ground, then the alien can seek
[discretionary] relief." Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted).
142. See id. at 488 (describing the legal sources for determining the relevant factors as
existing in a "text-free zone").
143. See id. ("Arbitrary agency action becomes no less so by simple dint of
repetition."); id. at 490 ("Cost is an important factor for agencies to consider in many
contexts. But cheapness alone cannot save an arbitrary agency policy.").
144. Id. at 485 (citation omitted). The Court performed a similar relevant factors
analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), when it held that the EPA acted
arbitrarily in refusing to initiate a rulemaking to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 534.
The EPA did cite several relevant factors in deciding not to initiate a rulemaking,
including the piecemeal approach to global warming of regulating new car emissions, the
international difficulties that could be created by a domestic regulation, the possibility of a
jurisdictional conflict with the Department of Transportation over any regulation
requiring increased fuel efficiency, and uncertainties regarding the relationship between
greenhouse gases and global warming. See Pierce, supra 51, at 78 (citing 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,928-32 (Sept. 8, 2003)). The Court found that the EPA's refusal was
impermissible because it did not consider the question of whether greenhouse gases
contribute to climate change. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533-34. Despite Congress's
silence regarding the relevant factors and the fact that all of the factors that EPA did
consider were logically relevant to its determination, the Court decided which issues were
sufficiently informative to demand inclusion under hard look review. See id.
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2. Rational Connection
Rational connection review'45  describes the judicial
determination of whether an agency's policy choice "runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise."' 46 This approach to arbitrariness review is both intuitive
and familiar. It is an important check on potentially unprincipled or
irrational administrative conduct that goes to the very heart of the
justifications of the administrative state; its deferential approach
fosters agency expertise and efficiency, while at the same time
guarding against the promulgation of administrative law that is so
irrational as to betray its democratic pedigree.147 It is also
paradigmatically substantive, as it focuses only on the quality of the
agency's value judgment-the specifics of its policy position and
whether its stated justifications offer persuasive logical support for
that position. It is only secondarily concerned with the first-order
steps taken by the agency to develop the supporting inputs for its
conclusion. Although these features of administrative action are
useful to a court's rational connection analysis, they impact the
court's rationality determination only to the extent they facilitate the
agency's justifications for its position. A court's final rational
connection decision is ultimately a review of second-order logical
reasoning and judgment by the agency that merits (and receives)
significant attention.
A recent example of rational connection review is the Supreme
Court's decision in Fox Television.'4 8 Justice Scalia, writing for the
145. This concept is synonymous with the second-order components of reason giving
discussed supra in Part II.A.2.
146. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
147. See, e.g., Jost Delbrilck, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State:
Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (2003) ("[W]e find several elements and criteria that are held to
contribute to the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority.... [Sluch criteria are
transparency and efficiency of government (or more broadly, public authority), and
actions and accountability .... Finally, we may add expertise as a factor that can
contribute to the acceptability of acts of public authorities.").
148. See 556 U.S. 502, 517-18 (2009). For a more detailed discussion of the Court's Fox
Television opinion, see supra Part L.A (discussing the Court's arbitrary and capricious
decision analysis generally), Part II.A.4. (discussing Fox Television as an example of the
research scope category of deconstructed arbitrariness review). See also, e.g., Nat'l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000-01 (2005) ("We
conclude ... that the Commission [did not act arbitrarily because it] provided a reasoned
explanation for treating cable modem service differently from DSL service.");
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (finding
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majority, explained that the FCC was reasonable in assuming that
fleeting expletives were likely to cause harm to younger viewers
because even a fleeting statement can constitute a damaging and
lasting "first blow."149 By contrast, the dissent concluded that the
FCC's stated justifications for its harsher treatment of fleeting
expletives could not be reasonable because all of its proffered
justifications were available when the Agency adopted its earlier,
more permissive approach; without additional support justifying the
policy change, the dissent determined that the change was not
rational."so This split among the Justices is an example of the existence
and dynamic nature of rational connection review. Not only did the
Justices in Fox Television feel comfortable evaluating the logic and
consistency of the Agency's substantive policy decision, but they
reached directly opposite conclusions as to what reasonable agency
conduct should look like in that instance.
The high degree of attention paid to the rational connection
portion of hard look review could be seen to counsel against
deconstruction. After all, courts are already quite willing to tackle the
question of whether an agency's final policy decision was supported
by the administrative record and often do so with a singular focus. In
fact, if there is one category of arbitrariness review that seems well
suited to be all-inclusive, it is the rational connection category.151
Maybe this preference reflects an optimal version of arbitrary and
capricious review, such that courts should move away from singling
out other forms of agency conduct such as record building and
relevant factors analysis and treat everything as part of a rational
connection review. Such a focus would thereby obviate the need for
serious consideration of any modes of agency conduct prior to a final
policy decision.
that the Attorney General did not act arbitrarily in denying discretionary waiver of
deportation because "[i]t is assuredly rational, and therefore lawful, for her to distinguish
aliens ... who engage in a pattern of immigration fraud from aliens who commit a single,
isolated act of misrepresentation"); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983) (holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not
act arbitrarily because it showed a "rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made" in adopting a zero-release assumption for the storage of nuclear waste).
149. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 517-18 (citations omitted).
150. See id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It ... makes eminent sense to require the
Commission to justify why its prior policy is no longer sound before allowing it to change
course.").
151. In a slightly different context, Professor Mark Seidenfeld has expressed the view
that the "reasoned decision-making standard . . . is essentially process based" and thus can
be understood as encapsulating a wide range of agency conduct. See Seidenfeld, supra
note 7, at 155.
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This Article contends-and seeks to show-that the opposite is
true, but at a minimum it would seem that if these opposing views
exist, they demand further exploration. As the above examples
demonstrate, the Supreme Court has applied hard look review in
some capacity to nearly every category within the proposed
framework for deconstruction. 5 2 This recognition of the multifaceted
nature of agency decision making within hard look review supports
the theoretical foundation of deconstruction and highlights its
potential value, but it simultaneously begs the question: Is there really
something to gain from thinking of hard look review as a collection of
more targeted inquiries into specific aspects of agency activity?
III. WHY DECONSTRUCTION?
Deconstruction offers several potentially significant benefits for
courts, agencies, and the administrative state in general. First, it
creates a unique opportunity to consider the normative consequences
of each of the different facets of arbitrary and capricious review.
More specifically, deconstruction enables different categories of
agency activity to be evaluated against the core principles of judicial
deference and hard look review in order to shed some initial light on
how each category should be treated by the courts. Judicial deference
and hard look review are both fundamentally concerned with
questions of institutional competence, agency expertise, political
accountability, and transparency. In addition to advancing agency
epistemic authority and accountability, hard look review provides
courts with a check against administrative authority. Deconstruction
can help advance these purposes while also working to combat some
of the noted shortcomings of searching judicial review such as
ossification and agency capture.'53
Institutionally, deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review
benefits both courts and administrative agencies. Even without
providing clear prescriptions for deciding individual cases, 54
deconstruction enhances the depth and sophistication of the courts'
review in those cases, and also offers greater information to agencies
152. Input quality is the notable exception. See supra Part II.A.3.
153. Ossification and agency capture are two frequently discussed phenomena in
administrative law. See supra notes 15, 48 and accompanying text (defining agency capture
theory and ossification).




about how their choices will be received by the judiciary."-' Moreover,
it permits courts to make distinctions among different categories of
administrative action that could promote both the integrity of
individual agency decisions and administrative legitimacy more
broadly. Deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review also offers
system-wide advantages-advantages that accrue across multiple
branches of the federal government or of the government as a whole.
It advances a unifying theoretical foundation for judicial review of
agency policymaking and better describes actual practice in
administrative law, both of which promote systemic accountability
and transparency."' Finally, it advances the constitutional principle of
separation of powers by more accurately realigning Congress and the
courts in their interactions with each other through administrative
agencies."'
A. Normative Benefits
Deconstruction opens up a new set of categories for judicial
review and, in turn, an opportunity to more closely evaluate the
normative bases for that review. Because arbitrary and capricious
review is arguably best understood as a doctrine of deference, the
animating principles behind judicial deference to administrative
agencies serve as a useful background against which to ask whether
and how courts should treat each proposed category of arbitrariness
review going forward and what this reveals about hard look review
more broadly.
155. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (describing some of the potential
difficulties for courts in applying deconstruction but arguing that the conceptual
framework provided by deconstruction has substantial benefits even when it does not
necessarily make isolated instances of hard look review simpler or easier).
156. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 187 (1990) ("The
principle of political accountability has an unmistakable foundation in Article I of the
Constitution, and it is an overriding structural commitment of the document. The principle
has foundations as well in assessments of institutional performance. At the same time, it
operates to counteract characteristic failures in the regulatory process."); Molly Beutz,
Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 387,
428 (2003) (noting that transparency is a "precondition" to accountability as
"[t]ransparency ... facilitate[s] accountability because citizens need information to know
when to hold which leaders accountable for what decisions"); Mark Fenster, The Opacity
Of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 899 (2006) ("The most significant consequences
[of government transparency] flow from the public's increased ability to monitor
government activity and hold officials .. . accountable for their actions.").
157. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., WILLIAM S. JORDAN III & RICHARD W. MURPHY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (6th ed. 2010) (acknowledging the
importance of "reconcil[ing] the modem administrative state and the apparent structural
requirements of our two-hundred-some-year-old Constitution").
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1. Principles of Judicial Deference
The concept of judicial deference to administrative action is in
some ways merely the photographic negative of judicial review of that
action."' It seeks to answer the same general question as judicial
review-whether an agency has acted within the legal and political
space afforded it by Congress and the Constitution-and entrusts
courts to be the ultimate arbiter of that issue. Despite these
similarities, deference is nonetheless conceptually different from
judicial review, at least from an institutional perspective. Whereas
judicial review generally originates from the point of view of the
judiciary acting as a bulwark against agency overreaching, judicial
deference seeks out reasons to limit judicial intervention out of
respect for the epistemic and political benefits of agency discretion.'5 9
This analysis focuses on the deferential aspect of arbitrary and
capricious review for several reasons. First, courts often describe
arbitrariness review in terms of its limited nature and its respect for
agency judgment, both of which sound directly in concepts of
deference.6 o Second, the principles animating judicial deference are
fundamental to the structure and legitimacy of administrative law.
The concept of judicial deference impacts nearly every mode of
agency decision making and is directly reflective of the considerations
supporting the creation and empowerment of agencies within our
tripartite government. 6 ' Finally, deference is a worthy focus because
158. By judicial deference in this instance, this Article refers to the sliding scale of
judicial respect for administrative independence and competence that occurs across the
entire landscape of administrative law and varies based on the type of agency decision
under review and the procedures employed to reach that decision. By contrast, this Article
does not limit its discussion of deference to an effectively binary conception, where courts
simply permit agency decisions to stand without judicial interference.
159. See, e.g., Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional
Decision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 479-85 (2013) (discussing separately the epistemic
and political bases for judicial deference to agency decisions).
160. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
(explaining that a "court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency" under arbitrary and capricious review).
161. Professors Shapiro and Levy explained the significance of judicial review, which
under the working definition employed here is synonymous with judicial deference, to the
legitimacy of the administrative state:
In this country, judicial review and the legitimacy of administrative government
are inextricably intertwined.... The ultimate success of judicial review, however,
rests on the ability of the Supreme Court to articulate and implement principles
that place administrative government within a constitutional framework. This
responsibility includes both the doctrinal necessity of explaining how progressive
government is consistent with liberal values and the practical necessity of
articulating a version of judicial review that is an effective check and balance on
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it is a judicially-created concept that often operates with the force of
dispositive law despite not being expressly defined or consistently
applied with respect to administrative agencies. 162 This status as a
background-sometimes referred to as "stealth"163-feature of
administrative law renders deference, and especially the principles
behind it, a powerful and potentially underappreciated component of
administrative law.
There are at least two core principles motivating judicial
deference to administrative action: agency expertise and political
accountability.'" Deference to administrative expertise was originally
based on the technocratic model of administrative governance in
which agencies were created and administrators chosen for their
specialized, substantive knowledge.165  The technocratic model
presumed that expert bureaucrats would provide a well-informed,
objective perspective that would protect policymaking from undue
political influence.16 6 More recently, respect for institutional
competence and congressional design have emerged as the preferred
justifications for judicial deference to administrative decisions. 67
Epistemic deference sets wide boundaries within which
administrators may exercise their particularized knowledge. Courts
affirmatively avoid "substituting [their] judgment for that of the
administrative government. Unless both the doctrinal and practical necessities are
met when individual judicial decisions are made, judicial review will be reduced to
its symbolic element and the legitimation of administrative government will be
more myth than reality.
Shapiro & Levy, supra note 3, at 395.
162. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the
Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 953 (1999) ("The practice of deference has drastic
effects on the outcomes of cases.").
163. See Berger, supra note 159, at 469.
164. See id. at 479 ("Courts often defer to administrative agencies because of their
epistemic or political authority.").
165. See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
441 (1987) (describing the "New Deal enthusiasm for insulated and technically expert
agencies" and noting that "the New Deal conception of administration sought to insulate
public officials in order to protect governmental processes against the distortions
produced by factionalism").
166. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1252 (1986) ("As in its initial phase, the New Deal continued its propensity to
address particularized areas of unrest through regulation by experts .... "); id. at 1266
("With the final legitimation of the New Deal came the acceptance of a central precept of
public administration: faith in the ability of experts to develop effective solutions .... ).
167. See Meazell, supra note 5, at 1764 ("Judicial deference to administrative agencies
is often grounded in ... comparative institutional expertise.").
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[expert] agency"168 and intervene in agency conclusions only when
they exceed the basic parameters of rationality or plausibility.169
The principle of political accountability-the idea that
government institutions like administrative agencies should be subject
to public scrutiny'o-recognizes the representative gap between
agencies and the courts. The Constitution protects judicial
independence by insulating judges from the political branches or the
polity at large."' Agencies, by contrast, occupy a unique place within
our constitutional structure. Although they exercise the powers of all
three of the coordinate branches of government, they are not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution, 172 nor are administrators
subject to direct popular control via democratic election."' This lack
of electoral restraint on agency action makes accountability and
transparency key features of administrative legitimacy;174 without a
mechanism for holding agencies politically accountable for their
actions, agency conduct threatens to run afoul of our democratic
arrangement. On the other hand, although agencies are not directly
accountable to the electorate, they are far more politically restrained
168. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (quotation omitted).
169. See id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170. See Glen Staszewski, Reason Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1253,
1257-58 (2009) ("The existing political accountability paradigm ... focuses ... on a
perceived need to ensure that public officials are politically accountable to a majority of
the electorate for their specific policy decisions.").
171. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing for life tenure and salary protection for
federal judges).
172. Agencies are not entirely excluded from the constitutional text. Article II
anticipates the existence of executive departments in its language regarding presidential
requests for the opinion of the department heads. See U.S. CONST art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The
President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments .... )
173. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) ("Over the past century, the powers and
responsibilities of administrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question
the constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy."); Strauss, supra note 4,
at 575 (noting the difficulty in constitutional law of "understanding the relationships
between the agencies that actually do the work of law-administration, whose existence is
barely hinted at in the Constitution, and the three constitutionally named repositories of
all governmental power-Congress, President, and Supreme Court"). That is not to say
that agencies are wholly insulated from electoral politics or public influence. Beyond their
generally understood obligation to govern responsibly, there are also direct influences on
agencies from entities like the President and Congress, for instance, who are directly
responsive to the electorate.
174. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 156, at 187; Beutz, supra note 156, at 428; Fenster, supra
note 156, at 899.
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and responsive than the courts." Agencies are accountable to
Congress and the Executive for their authority, finances, and policy
priorities.' 6 The President appoints agency heads with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and in many cases those appointees are
removable at will by the President alone.17   This greater
accountability to the political branches is an animating theme of
judicial deference to agencies-because agencies are more responsive
to political will, courts should be reluctant to intervene too severely in
administrative decision making beyond protecting agencies'
accountability and transparency.
2. Agency Expertise and Institutional Competence
Deconstruction offers several insights into arbitrary and
capricious review, many of which become readily apparent when
viewed in the light of agency expertise and institutional competence.
Courts employing hard look review regularly defer to agency policy
judgments based on the agency's epistemic authority. 17  Although
agency expertise certainly supports some measure of judicial
deference, epistemic justifications become far less compelling when
we begin to unpack arbitrary and capricious review through
deconstruction.
Viewed broadly, the first- and second-order distinction in
arbitrariness review carries with it divergent epistemic justifications
for judicial deference. The agency's second-order conduct-its
ultimate policy determination and its choices regarding which
underlying factors are relevant to that decision-merits a high
measure of judicial respect based on agency expertise. However, its
first-order components-the quality and scope of data collected and
175. See Berger, supra note 159, at 482 ("Unlike elected legislatures and chief
executives, many administrative agents are unelected and are not directly answerable to
the people. Elected legislators may be less representative than many of us would like to
think, but, by virtue of their election, they are nonetheless more politically responsive than
unelected federal judges. By contrast, agencies' political accountability is, at best,
indirect.").
176. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 583 (outlining the relationships between agencies and
the coordinate branches).
177. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Officers of the United States
..... ); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that the President may
remove an executive officer without the consent of the Senate).
178. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376, 385 (1989) (noting
that the question presented for hard look review "implicates substantial agency expertise"
and determining that the agency's conclusion was not arbitrary or capricious at least in
part because it was based on "careful scientific analysis").
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the provision of reasons for its decision-are far less the product of
particularized agency experience or knowledge and are thus far more
likely to be within the institutional competence of the judiciary.
To further illustrate this distinction, consider an example
wherein the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") seeks to
regulate children's access to products containing high fructose corn
syrup for health reasons. The decision that high fructose corn syrup
presents a health risk to children and the FDA's explanation of its
reasons for that decision are substantive policy choices based on
administrative expertise in risk assessment. Similarly, the FDA's
choice as to which factors it should consider in making its decision is a
product of its substantive experience and expertise. Perhaps the
Agency looked at child obesity rates and the related healthcare costs,
but explained that it chose not to consider rates of athletic
participation among children in certain age groups or data regarding
which foods would likely serve as substitutes in children's diets in the
absence of products containing corn syrup. Those choices are based
on expertise that is not only present at the FDA, but that is lacking
(at least as an institutional matter) in the courts, and as such offers a
valid basis for greater judicial deference on epistemic grounds.
On the other hand, what about the Agency's first-order choices?
Are they matters of particularized agency knowledge that merit
special deference or respect, or are they sufficiently within the
institutional competency of the courts such that deference is less
justified? The creation of an administrative record and the provision
of reasons are not choices that depend on any experience or
knowledge unique to, or even present in greater amounts in, the
Agency. Because courts are just as capable as administrators in
determining whether a record exists to support a policy conclusion,"'
179. This statement implicates the tension between the rule against judicial
enhancement of agency procedures announced by the Court in Vermont Yankee and the
standard for hard look review articulated in Overton Park and its progeny. For a detailed
discussion of this tension, see infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text. The statement
also raises the question of when concerns about the adequacy of the administrative record
go beyond first-order concerns to second-order considerations (like the relevant factors
test) about which information to include in the record. The answer is up to the court in an
individual case and depends on which feature of the record the court deems to be
inadequate. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (discussing the record building and relevant
factors categories within deconstruction). This potential difficulty with categorizing agency
activity does not, however, detract from the value of deconstruction, as the very act of
asking the question about whether a problem in the administrative record is a first- or
second-order issue adds a layer of detail and sophistication to the analysis that has benefits
for courts, litigants and the administrative state in general. See infra Part III.D (explaining
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singling out these categories of arbitrariness review supports treating
them differently from conduct more directly connected to the final
policy decision.
The same may also be true, although perhaps not as clearly so, in
the areas of input quality and research scope. Input quality without
question implicates agency expertise in that it goes to the research
methods of individuals qualified in the relevant field. There are at
least two reasons, however, why input quality is not tied closely
enough to an agency's final policy judgments to merit as high a
measure of deference as a second-order determination. The first is
that input quality is not limited to technical information. The quality
of relevant inputs is an important issue for all manner of supporting
data, including non-technical information.'s This means that
generalist judges may simply find themselves reviewing the reputation
or qualifications of the information's source to determine input
quality, a task that is not so far beyond judicial expertise that it
entitles the agency to a large degree of epistemic deference. Secondly,
where technical or scientific inputs are at issue, judges are still able to
competently review the agency's procedures for safeguarding the
reliability of those inputs. Even if judges are not equipped to
understand the details of a particular study or scientific inquiry,
factors like agency reliance on blind peer review or agency responses
to significant comments in rulemaking are within judicial competence.
Thus, there is less basis for deference to agency claims of reliable data
than to the second-order application of that information to a specific
policy position.'
Research scope is another example of a first-order decision by an
agency that is less dependent on agency expertise than a monolithic
view of arbitrariness would suggest. The quantity of information
gathered and consulted by an agency in policymaking may initially
seem like a second-order issue, and for good reason. The specific
information relied upon by an agency is the product of a substantive
choice that is influenced by administrators' particularized knowledge
of the subject matter. The range of relevant information from which
that specific information is drawn, however, is less of a second-order
consideration because it is too far attenuated from the agency's
ultimate value judgment to be thought of as directly affecting the
how the potential difficulty of implementing deconstruction does not outweigh its
benefits).
180. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part II.A.3 for a more detailed discussion of how input quality can be
measured without exceeding judicial competence.
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policy outcome." Moreover, to the extent that concerns about the
range of information brought before the agency can be identified with
specificity by the parties, the court may be better equipped to
determine whether potentially useful information was omitted from
the administrative process than, for example, whether the agency's
value judgment about how to apply that information to a policy issue
was sound. Since it is not dependent on any technical or otherwise
particularized knowledge other than what potentially relevant
information was available and whether it was part of the agency's
research, research scope can be largely viewed as a first-order
question in agency policymaking.183 When isolated as its own subject
of arbitrariness review, an agency's choice as to the scope of its
research is both sufficiently important to the integrity and
reasonableness of the administrative decision and well enough within
the institutional competence of the judiciary that it does not
necessarily merit a high level of deference on epistemic grounds.
In addition to the significant differences between first- and
second-order categories of agency action, each of these broader
categories is susceptible to still finer distinctions. These finer
distinctions further support the value of deconstructing arbitrary and
capricious review, especially as it pertains to agency expertise and
institutional competence. For example, within second-order
arbitrariness review, an agency's statutory relevant factors analysis is
arguably less deserving of judicial deference than its rational
connection analysis. This is because statutory relevant factors analysis
is the product of a legislative mandate regarding which factors an
agency must consider in reaching a policy decision. Although the
process of implementing those mandates may require some
substantive judgments by the agency, courts are generally more
competent to evaluate whether an agency has met legislative
182. For further discussion of why research scope is best thought of as a first-order
category, see supra Part II.A.4.
183. That is not to say that all research scope questions are necessarily first-order
issues. Questions could certainly arise about an agency's research scope that look more
like second-order relevant factors issues, especially where the relevance of the allegedly
overlooked or excluded research was under debate. In those cases, courts are free within
the deconstruction framework to treat the question before them in whatever way they see
fit; the fact that the specific category an issue fits into is not always clear does not change




expectations then they are to judge the wisdom of an agency's final
policy position.18
In the first-order context, the quality of administrative inputs and
the scope of agency research are more difficult for courts to evaluate
than the far more straightforward questions of whether the agency
assembled an adequate record or articulated any reasons whatsoever
in support of its decision. Data quality and research scope implicate at
least some particularized knowledge of the relevant subject matter,
while record building and first-order reason giving are purely
procedural steps. This does not mean that there is no difference
between input quality and research scope on the one hand and
second-order issues like relevant factors analysis and rational
connection on the other hand. Courts are still more competent to
decide the first two issues than the more substantive second-order
questions, but they are even better poised to address purely
procedural issues like the existence of a record or reasons supporting
the agency's conclusion than any of the other four deconstructed
rationales of hard look review."ss Epistemic deference is thus a sliding
scale that can be truly appreciated only by first deconstructing
arbitrary and capricious review into its constituent parts. Without
deconstruction, even high-level distinctions between first- and
second-order administrative decisions would be at best
underappreciated and at worst lost.
A possible retort to this case for deconstruction is that courts
already effectively make the kinds of distinctions suggested above,
and for that reason deconstruction is either redundant or superfluous.
More specifically, skeptics may offer examples of hard look review
where the court did not defer to the agency's epistemic authority
when it overturned or remanded a decision for first-order reasons
such as failure to create a sufficient record. By contrast, when
reviewing an agency's rational connection analysis, courts regularly
184. This, of course, assumes that any statutory factors are expressed unambiguously,
thereby avoiding the complications of Chevron step two. See supra notes 126-34 and
accompanying text (describing the two contexts in which relevant factors analysis exists-
statutory relevant factors and congressional silence). Where the statute is ambiguous, that
could be considered representative of congressional silence and thus arguably the relative
institutional competencies presented here may no longer attach. Regardless of whether
step two of Chevron changes relevant factors analyses in the face of congressional silence,
the fact that such a change may be necessary is the reason why deconstruction is a worthy
endeavor.
185. The other four rationales are input quality, research scope, relevant factors, and
rational connection. For a detailed discussion of these rationales, see supra Part II.A.3-
B.2.
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defer to a far greater degree. In short, the argument goes,
deconstruction is merely descriptive of a phenomenon that is already
well-established in administrative law. There are several responses to
this objection.
The first is that no matter how much one is convinced that some
of the present distinctions are already part of arbitrariness review, the
Supreme Court has never articulated so much as the high-level
distinction between first- and second-order considerations in its
arbitrary and capricious jurisprudence, making it at best tenuous to
contend that deconstruction as defined here is currently an active part
of administrative law. Second, even if courts do sometimes make the
distinctions highlighted by deconstruction, they rarely do so explicitly
or self-consciously, and for that reason alone it is important to try to
bring some theoretical integrity to such a consequential area of the
law. Third, some of the more granular categories presented here (like
input quality) do not appear anywhere in the Court's arbitrary and
capricious cases, despite having an arguably profound effect on the
integrity of agency policymaking. Fourth, even if deconstruction is
ultimately no more than a descriptive exercise it may nonetheless
offer an insightful new way to understand and reconcile the courts'
seemingly inchoate hard look jurisprudence.'8 6
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the relative deference
analyses made possible by deconstruction may also help courts
determine the absolute value of deference in a given case. By
breaking arbitrariness review into its constituent parts, courts can
more easily understand how each component of agency action reflects
the expertise and institutional competence of the agency and can
adjust their deference allocations for each category relative to the
others. This more nuanced view of epistemic deference may also
assist courts in calibrating the total amount of deference given to a
specific category of agency action. For example, just as deconstruction
encourages courts to offer greater deference to agency rational
connection analyses than input quality determinations, it can also
help a court set the degree of deference it will apply to a rational
connection analysis regardless of whether another category of agency
action is relevant in that case. When based on deconstructed
arbitrariness review, this degree of deference will be more principled,
as it will more accurately reflect the importance of institutional
186. This positive claim for the potential descriptive value of deconstruction is beyond
the scope of this Article, but it is the subject of future intended work by the Author.
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competence and agency expertise to the interaction* of agencies and
courts.
3. Political Accountability and Transparency
Deconstruction is also useful in helping courts use deference to
promote political accountability and transparency. When treated as a
singular phenomenon, arbitrariness review seeks to provide agencies
with sufficient political space to exercise their own value judgments.
The idea is that nearly all of the limits on agency value judgments can
be better provided by political forces, either from the political
branches or the public at large, and judicial review is designed to
facilitate the processes that lead to those judgments." While this
approach is certainly a useful way to think about hard look review in
general, it stops short of asking the next question, namely whether
and to what degree agency accountability justifies deference toward
each individual category of agency activity. The answer to that
question is better understood through deconstruction.
The first- and second-order distinction within arbitrary and
capricious review offers one example of how different categories can
offer very different measures of administrative accountability and
transparency. In general, the first-order categories have far less of an
impact on accountability than their second-order counterparts.
Agency decisions to build a record, offer reasons for their
conclusions, or rely on certain data sources provide very little
substantive information upon which interested members of the public
may evaluate an agency's performance, especially when compared to
the amount and quality of information provided by second-order
relevant factors and rational connection analyses. Moreover, where
an agency fails in its first-order tasks of record building or reason
giving, the overwhelming lack of publicly available information
renders the entire policymaking process far less transparent or
accessible, such that outside observers are left with little or no basis
on which to judge the quality of the agency's decision making. Input
quality and research scope offer similar difficulties. Public attention
to an agency's choices to exclude or ignore certain information in its
deliberative process may offer some means of holding the agency
accountable for its decision. However, the potentially technical nature
187. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 7, at 159-60 ("In essence, the arbitrary and
capricious standard recognizes that the political arena is the appropriate forum for
constraining any value choices made by the agency in rulemaking .... [but] there is a role
for judicial review to facilitate proper operation of the political arena.").
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of the information at issue and the fact that outsiders would be forced
to compare the agency's choices against the entire universe of
potentially relevant, excluded information make it very difficult for
these categories to offer any meaningful measure of agency
accountability or transparency. As a result, political deference is less
easily justified in the first-order context.
Second-order categories, by comparison, are much more
accessible to public review and critique. An agency's final policy
conclusions provide the best example of this. The decision itself is
transparent by virtue of its promulgation, and, provided the agency
did not employ arbitrary first-order procedures in reaching that
decision,'" the quality of the agency's judgment is the type of political
determination that we treat all manner of political actors, including
the general public, as equipped to evaluate in an open society. An
agency's determination about the relevant factors to be considered in
its analysis is slightly more difficult from an accountability and
transparency viewpoint. As with the first-order categories, relevant
factors analyses could involve decisions about the exclusion of
information that could be difficult for the political branches or the
general public to properly identify and understand. A relevant factors
analysis nevertheless offers greater opportunities for transparency
and accountability than its first-order counterparts because it involves
political considerations that bear immediately on the final policy
outcome rather than on narrower questions of information quality
and quantity, which are even more likely to be outside the bounds of
political actors' core competencies. Because relevant factors decisions
are more closely tied to issues that political actors are familiar with
and capable of evaluating for themselves, relevant factors questions
offer a greater measure of transparency and accountability than the
first-order categories of arbitrariness review even if they offer less
accountability and transparency than the final agency decision itself.
Accountability and transparency are important principles in
administrative law and are key factors in judges' decisions to defer to
agency positions. All political deference decisions, however, are not
created equal. Deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review into its
constituent parts allows us to better identify where deference on
political grounds is best suited to achieve its goal of providing
agencies the flexibility needed to achieve their missions without
running afoul of their democratic obligations. First-order categories
188. This effect is further reason for courts to independently scrutinize first-order
decisions within the framework of deconstruction.
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of review appear to offer less accountability in general than second-
order ones, yet within each category there is further room for
variation. More important than the specific character of each category
of review, however, is the point that deconstruction offers fertile
ground for distinctions that can offer normative as well as positive
benefits to administrative law.
Moreover, as with epistemic deference, the relative conclusions
reached with regard to political accountability can benefit courts'
deference decisions in absolute terms. By understanding that certain
first-order categories, for instance, are less deserving of deference
than other first- or second-order ones, courts have a better
framework in which to determine exactly how much leeway agencies
should receive within each category. This information not only
improves individual deference determinations, but also offers a
theoretical basis for courts to render more consistent and principled
deference determinations going forward.
4. Agency Discretion, the Interest Group Model, and Capture
In addition to promoting agency expertise and accountability,
deconstruction also serves several of the remaining purposes of hard
look review. It helps courts find the proper balance between broad
administrative authority and an agency's democratic responsibility to
govern rationally and in the public interest. It also dilutes the negative
effects of the interest group model of administrative government and
agency capture. The interest group model seeks to prevent regulated
entities with fewer information costs and greater resources from
gaining undue influence in the administrative process.189 It is informed
by agency capture theory, which warns that regulators who interact
with a particular industry over time tend to become overly
sympathetic to the interests and concerns of that industry at the
expense of their duty to act in the public interest.'90
A monolithic approach to arbitrariness review makes it more
difficult for courts to draw clear boundaries among different
189. See Seidenfeld, supra note 7, at 154 ("In the regulatory arena, regulated entities
control relevant information and thus do not bear the same costs in order to participate in
the regulatory process. Those with focused interests, which often also correspond to the
regulated entities, have the advantage of lower costs of organizing and coordinating
action." (footnotes omitted)).
190. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATION 62-66 (Richard B. Russell Lecture Ser. No. 6, 1988) (describing
capture theory as the phenomenon of how, over time, agencies "tend[] to see the world
more and more the way the [regulated] industry sees it" and tend "to regulate in the
interest of the regulated").
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categories of agency activity. This leads to a number of potential
problems. For one, reviewing courts may be more likely to simply
reach the wrong conclusion in specific cases,191 thereby frustrating or
eliminating an agency's achievement of potentially important and
widely beneficial policy goals. Conversely, courts may allow policy
choices that are not based on reasoned, responsive government, such
as those anticipated by the interest group model or agency capture
theory. Moreover, agencies could react to the inconsistency of hard
look reviewl92 in at least two different but similarly unfortunate ways.
They could refrain from activities that could trigger such review
(ossification),"' or they could seek to exert pressure on the judiciary
by pressing their policy agenda despite the possibility of judicial
resistance.'9 4 This latter approach could enhance the influence of
agency capture as a fractured relationship between agencies and the
courts could embolden agencies to provide rents to preferred entities
or industries. In any event, both cases create costs to the
administrative process that are worth avoiding. Lastly, the
institutional integrity of both branches suffers in the face of perceived
inconsistent-or worse, unprincipled-judicial judgment that could
result from monolithic hard look review.
Deconstruction offers some solutions to these potential
problems. For first-order issues like the building of an administrative
record or the supplying of reasons for an agency's decision, the
bounds of agency discretion are far clearer than for second-order
questions such as the agency's choice of relevant factors or proffer of
a rational connection between its stated explanation and policy
conclusion. Although deconstruction cannot eliminate all of the
specific difficulties associated with judicial review of second-order
191. See infra Part III.B (discussing the greater potential for accuracy in hard look
review due to deconstruction).
192. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 1065-66 ("[T]he arbitrary and capricious
standard is relatively open-ended, and the Supreme Court has not given it more precise
content.").
193. See infra Part III.A.5.
194. A recent example of an agency pressing its agenda in tension with a judicial order
is the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") decision to continue with prosecution
and enforcement proceedings against CLC Holdings, LLC and Cablevision Systems
despite the D.C. Circuit's recent decision that President Obama's recess appointments to
the Board are unconstitutional. See Noel Canning v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 705 F.3d
490, 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013); Letter from Lafe E. Solomon,
Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd., to Eugene Scalia, Esq., Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP (May 28, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (explaining
that the NLRB will not suspend its proceedings against CLC Holdings based on the
court's decision in Noel Canning).
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arbitrariness questions, it can ease some of the tensions over hard
look review by separating out the more accessible first-order
questions and offering a new perspective on second-order issues such
that the availability and scope of judicial deference to administrative
judgment is more clearly delineated.
Furthermore, first-order issues may be especially important to
the problems of the interest group model and capture theory.
Questions of data quality and research scope are easy ways for
agencies to realize the fears of the interest group model by protecting
certain entities without having to publicly explain why those
preferences were exercised. Consider an agency's reliance on two
conflicting scientific studies to conclude that scientific uncertainty
counseled in favor of a rent-creating outcome for the regulated
industry."' Now imagine that one of those studies was done by an
independent researcher and was peer reviewed, and the other was
performed by the regulated industry and was not. Without having to
engage in the second-order question of whether scientific uncertainty
in fact exists or justifies the chosen policy outcome-questions that
the presence of a single flawed study does not necessarily answer-
courts could focus their review on the agency's failure to employ
reliable information in its administrative process, a threshold question
that is easier and more clearly within the realm of judicial
competence than broader questions of the veracity of the scientific
claim.'96 Similarly, if only one study was proffered, courts could focus
195. The term "rent" in this context is better described as economic rent, which
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried define as the "extra returns that firms or
individuals obtain due to their positional advantages." LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 62 (2004); see also Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the
Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 300 n.253 (2012) (defining
economic rent as "[w]hen a company, organization or individual uses their resources to
obtain an economic gain from others without reciprocating any benefits back to society
through wealth creation" (quoting Rent-Seeking, INVESTOPEDIA,
www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rentseeking.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2014))).
196. That is not to say that inquiries into the reliability of scientific information are
without their own challenges. For example, if an agency failed to discover a potentially
useful study, there could be significant costs in ordering the agency to revisit its decision.
An agency could also potentially convert a first-order issue like input reliability into a
second-order question of reason giving or rationality by publicly explaining its decision
about which information to rely upon. Although both of these examples represent real
possibilities for added complexity in the application of deconstruction to a specific case,
they do not undermine the value of the enterprise itself. The perspective provided by
deconstruction still offers courts a useful tool for thinking about-and ultimately
performing-hard look review by encouraging them to consider each aspect of agency
policymaking separately when deciding how much their review should defer to agency
authority. Deconstruction is not a bright-line rule for arbitrary and capricious review, but
rather a way to approach the review process that allows courts to more accurately
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their attention on the research scope question without venturing into
the murkier balancing of considerations and policy preferences
required by second-order determinations. Finally, concerns about
judicial overreaching are diluted by the fact that deconstruction
renders courts more transparent in their review process, thereby
signaling with specificity to agencies the range of issues upon which
the court will focus its review.' 9 7 With advance knowledge of this full
range of judicial considerations, an agency can better tailor its
decision-making process to meet judicial expectations, which in turn
gives courts less of a basis to interfere in agency policymaking.
5. Ossification
The potential for ossification of agency rulemaking-what
Professor Pierce described as "the extreme cost and delay attendant
to the use of notice and comment procedures to issue a rule"' 9 8-is an
oft-cited, albeit not uncontroversial, shortcoming of hard look
review.'99 To the extent that hard look review does ossify agency
rulemaking, deconstruction could offer some encouragement for
agencies to continue in their regulatory missions without sacrificing
the benefits to rationality and accountability presented by judicial
review. Unlike one-dimensional arbitrariness review, deconstructed
hard look review serves an information-giving function for agencies
that allows them to more carefully conduct themselves in certain
areas while creating additional regulatory space in others. Even at its
most generalized, deconstruction signals to agencies that first-order
issues will be more closely scrutinized, ensuring that agencies meet
the base requirements of building a record, offering reasons and
ensuring the proper scope and quality of data in their policymaking.
Once these hurdles are overcome, however, deconstruction signals to
agencies that second-order issues like the relevant factors and
understand and apply principles of judicial deference to agency action. See supra page 739
(explaining the need for flexible application of deconstruction in individual cases).
197. This phenomenon also offers the benefit of creating more specific lines of
precedent within hard look review. The availability of more focused precedents could add
even more clarity to judicial review of agency policymaking. See infra Part IIL.B
(discussing the institutional benefits of more informative hard look precedents due to
deconstruction).
198. Pierce, supra note 48, at 59 n.1 (citation omitted).
199. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 7, at 393-94; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking
Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1493, 1499 (2012); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification
Critique ofJudicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 252 (2009); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan
Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal
Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990,80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1427 (2012).
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rational connection analyses should receive greater latitude. This
more particularized guidance should reduce existing deterrents to
agency action and could help alleviate ossification by offering
sufficient comfort to administrators to overcome some of their
concerns about the severity of judicial oversight.
In sum, there are many potential normative benefits to
deconstruction, both in terms of its positive effects on courts' broader
deference determinations and its advancement of the underlying
goals of hard look review. These normative incentives, however, are
not the only reasons to consider deconstruction. There are also
significant institutional and systemic benefits to reconceptualizing
hard look review.
B. Institutional Advantages
In addition to its normative benefits, deconstruction offers
institutional advantages for both courts and agencies. Deconstruction
offers courts a more focused approach to arbitrary and capricious
review that could improve the quality of their review in individual
cases. Rather than simply citing the highly deferential standard that
has become commonplace in arbitrariness cases and then treating the
entire administrative process as a single, monolithic enterprise, courts
relying on a deconstructed view of arbitrariness can single out the
specific area or areas of agency action that raise concerns and tailor
their reviews accordingly. The result is a more transparent, consistent
approach to arbitrariness review. This new approach could enhance
the integrity and reputation of reviewing courts, which are often
accused of politically motivated decision making in the arbitrary and
capricious context, as well as enhancing the provision of deference
and potential remedies. First-order errors may call for less deference
but also less intrusive remedies such as remand, whereas second-
order issues could lead to greater judicial deference but more severe
consequences like invalidation. Regardless of how courts choose to
use the additional information and insight offered by deconstruction,
the fact that it allows for more robust consideration of the entirety of
an agency's policymaking process makes it a worthwhile, and
institutionally beneficial, exercise.
Deconstruction also enables courts to better distinguish across
different types of policy questions that come before them on arbitrary
and capricious review. For example, complex scientific or technical
questions may demand even greater second-order deference than
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non-scientific issues due to the highly specialized nature of the subject
matter.200 Moreover, deconstruction enables courts to tailor their
arbitrariness review to considerations of agency rulemaking versus
adjudication. The more structured and deliberate framework
attending formal and informal rulemaking may render second-order
arbitrariness review less appealing. This is because the opportunities
for interested parties to participate in the rulemaking process
promote transparency and accountability and act as a potential
political constraint on agency discretion. In less procedurally
structured contexts such as informal adjudication, more searching
second-order review may be necessary to protect against agency
overreaching in the absence of robust procedural safeguards.2 01
Courts, however, are not the only beneficiaries of deconstructed
arbitrary and capricious review. Shifting the framework for hard look
review will lead to a new generation of "deconstructed" hard look
decisions. These decisions can be helpful precedents both
horizontally, to promote consistency within a particular court, or
vertically, to give guidance to lower courts about how judicial
deference should be apportioned along the spectrum of first- and
second-order agency activities. In addition to making judges' lives
easier, the development of hard look precedent within a
deconstructed framework may benefit litigants, as they will be able to
make better arguments and predictions about how a court will view
their case. Finally, deconstruction offers agencies clearer instructions
as to how they should prioritize their policymaking. It makes the
review process more transparent and consistent, which in turn allows
agencies to make policy with greater knowledge of what the judiciary
expects of them. Over time, as courts continue to perform
200. See Balt. Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983) ("When examining ... [a] scientific determination [that is at the frontiers of
science], as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its
most deferential."); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring) ("[I]n cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to guard
against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the judges
themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is to establish a
decision-making process that assures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the
scrutiny of the scientific community and the public." (quoting Int'l Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring))). See generally
Meazell, supra note 98 (describing the phenomenon of judicial "super-deference" to
agency science). For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between deconstruction
and judicial review of agency science, see supra Part III.A.3.
201. The converse may also be true, for instance where interest group influences crowd
out other participants in the rulemaking process. Either way, the differences between
rulemaking and adjudicative processes offer another potential basis for employing the
kind of targeted review that deconstruction is meant to facilitate.
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deconstructed arbitrary and capricious review, agencies may
internalize the distinctions among various categories of agency action.
The result could be an integrated system of policymaking and judicial
review based on deconstruction that better reflects the interbranch
comity and cooperation envisioned by the separation of powers.
C. Systemic Improvements
Systemically, deconstruction offers several benefits to the
administrative state writ large as well as to our tripartite
constitutional democracy. First, it promotes the theoretical integrity
of judicial review. This is a valuable contribution because it offers
principled limitations to both sides of the delicate balance between
agencies and the courts over matters of public policy. By encouraging
courts to think more pointedly about the feature of agency action
under review and whether that feature is rationally justified,
deconstruction limits judicial review of agency policymaking. This
limitation not only prevents courts from overreaching into political
determinations by administrators but it also projects an appearance of
judicial restraint that is legitimizing for the administrative state.
Conversely, deconstruction provides clear notice and puts
additional-and appropriate-pressure on agencies to focus on each
aspect of their policymaking and to ensure that they are meeting their
epistemic and political responsibilities. Deconstruction counsels
agencies to take extra care to employ, and defend their use of,
rational procedures as well as rational outcomes. Due to agencies'
unique place in the interstices of our constitutional democracy,2 " the
additional accountability and transparency associated with
deconstruction enhances the credentials and perception of the
administrative state.
A second systemic advantage of deconstruction is that it more
accurately describes current practice in administrative law. This
advantage has ramifications for the quality of judicial review and
agency policymaking, but perhaps even more importantly for the
public perception of both. The impact on the quality of judicial review
from accurately describing current practice is felt both horizontally
within a given court over time, and vertically through the entire
judicial system. Taking the Supreme Court as an example,
deconstruction's more accurate accounting of the Court's hard look
jurisprudence offers a clearer framework for future decisions. This
framework could thus help to bring greater clarity and consistency to
202. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 575.
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a doctrine that has been historically uneven.203 A similar benefit can
accrue vertically by offering lower courts more structure within which
to perform their reviews and a more targeted collection of precedents
to guide them. All of these improvements project beyond the
judiciary as an institution because they help bring greater integrity
and reliability to the courts' exercise of their authority as unelected
reviewers of the political branches.2 M Perhaps more importantly, they
project a degree of interbranch cooperation and governmental
competence that advances the public's faith in its institutions.
The final systemic benefit of deconstruction lies in its effect on
the constitutional relationship among Congress, the executive, and
the courts. Interbranch comity is an essential feature of the separation
of powers.205 The branches are coequal and necessarily interactive,206
and while each possesses powerful checks designed to maintain a
sense of equilibrium and balance within the federal structure, the
confrontational or unwelcome use of those checks may trade short-
term gains for long-term losses in governmental efficiency and
203. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 1065-66.
204. This anti-democratic feature of the federal courts has long been the subject of a
heated debate among constitutional law scholars. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 4, at 16-23;
ELY, supra note 4, at 86-104.
205. Professor Paulsen uses the term "coordinacy" to describe the same concept:
The "coordinacy" of the three branches of the federal government is one of the
fundamental political axioms of our federal Constitution. ... This does not mean
that the branches are equal in the quantum of powers assigned to them....
Coordinacy is a term of power-relationship, not of power-scope.... It is the idea of
coordinacy, even more than the cognate concept of separation on which it depends
and builds, that fuels the system of "checks and balances" that guards against "a
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands."
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What The
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 228-29 (1994); see also, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of
Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 226
(1990) ("[T]he separation of powers assumes a minimum level of interbranch comity.").
206. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997) ("[O]ur ... system imposes
upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as
well as independence the absence of which 'would preclude the establishment of a Nation
capable of governing itself effectively.' " (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); id. at
703 ("As Madison explained, separation of powers does not mean that the branches 'ought
to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other.' " (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961))); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While
the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon
its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
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productivity.207 Deconstruction works to enhance interbranch comity
in a way that helps realize the fullest expression of our tripartite
government. To the extent deconstruction makes judicial review of
agency policymaking more focused and effective, it properly orients
the courts in their role as a constitutional check on Congress and the
executive. Arbitrariness review based on more detailed, nuanced, and
principled considerations of agency action cabins the judiciary within
its proper role of protecting against constitutional boundary-crossing
by Congress or administrative agencies. Singling out second-order
issues such as relevant factors and rational connection analysis for
more deferential treatment affirms congressional authority to shape
the scope and purpose of agency authority while honoring the full
spectrum of political discretion bestowed upon the Executive by the
legislature. The ultimate result is more robust and dynamic
interaction among the three coordinate branches that best represents
the principle of separation of powers.
The goal of deconstructing arbitrary and capricious review is to
offer a more theoretically sound and descriptively accurate account of
judicial review of agency policymaking. The normative, institutional,
and systemic benefits that accrue from deconstruction confirm its
value. But just as deconstruction offers significant benefits to
administrative law and our constitutional democracy more broadly, it
also presents some potential costs.
D. Deconstruction's Costs
Deconstruction introduces several levels of complexity into
arbitrariness review that could prove difficult for courts and
commentators. First and likely most obvious is the problem of
actually doing the deconstruction. Classification of certain forms of
agency conduct as first- or second-order could be difficult for
reviewing courts. Distinctions within each of these broader
classifications, for example between the first-order categories of input
quality and research scope, may prove even more difficult. Although
these categories are theoretically distinguishable from one another
and do in fact represent different parts of the overall policymaking
process, it is easy to imagine how different courts could draw
boundaries among these categories differently, potentially leading to
207. An extreme version of this phenomenon has been described as a "constitutional
showdown" by Professors Posner and Vermeule: "a disagreement between branches of
government over their constitutional powers." Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 997 (2008).
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incongruous results in similar cases. This potential inconsistency
could then detract from several of the benefits of deconstruction
mentioned above, including the clarification of arbitrary and
capricious review.208
While these concerns are certainly valid, they ultimately do not
dilute the overall value of deconstruction. As an initial matter, a
similar level of confusion is already apparent in the courts' treatment
of hard look review,209 so it is unlikely a more explicit organizing
framework would exacerbate the problem. Moreover, deconstruction
does not rely heavily on the courts' choices of specific subcategories
of review, or even on the clarity of the boundaries between broader
categories like first- and second-order arbitrariness. The foregoing
analysis is designed to show that valid theoretical distinctions exist
among different features of agency policymaking and that at least at
the highest levels, some practical distinctions can be made that will
reflect actual agency practice. The theoretical differences between
gauging the reliability of specific informational inputs and weighing
relevant policy considerations, for example, should not be terribly
controversial. Additionally, whereas some categorizations between
first- and second-order agency practices may be challenging, others
will not. It is relatively easy to identify a decision to provide reasons
as a first-order issue and a final policy conclusion as a second-order
determination.
Once these core points are established, the challenge of
categorization is best understood as a matter of judicial reasoning and
experience that is within the competency of the courts. It is also not
likely to dilute the ultimate value of deconstruction. As courts employ
deconstruction over time, categories may well evolve and coalesce
into a more consistent, deconstructed framework that is increasingly
easier to apply. If not, and courts continue to struggle with creating
and using the subcategories that result from deconstruction, then the
benefits of deconstruction may be less robust, but they are
nonetheless still significant. Deconstruction would still empower
courts to more accurately evaluate the normative justifications for
their deference decisions, to think of potential arbitrariness in more
targeted and sophisticated terms, and to better balance the judicial
role of protecting against administrative overreaching with the
political branches' mandate to set public policy. Regardless of exactly
208. See supra Part III.A-C (outlining the benefits of deconstruction, including that it
offers a more accurate and transparent form of hard look review).
209. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 10, at 1065-66 (describing the uncertainty of the
Supreme Court's arbitrary and capricious standard).
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what the resulting deconstructed framework looks like, its very
existence moves arbitrary and capricious review forward in ways that
promote better judicial decision making, administrative legitimacy,
and interbranch comity.
Another potential objection to deconstruction is that it runs
afoul of the prohibition on judicially mandated rulemaking
procedures first set forth in Vermont Yankee and rearticulated in
Pension Guaranty Benefit Corp. v. LTV Corp.2 10 Vermont Yankee
introduced the now-seminal rule that courts may not require agencies
to employ procedures beyond those required by statute, including the
APA.2 11 An argument could be made that asking courts to separately
consider an agency's first-order procedural choices within hard look
review constitutes an invalid judicial intrusion into agency
procedures. Although Vermont Yankee famously set the standard,
LTV Corp. is the more instructive case on this point. LTV Corp.
involved an informal adjudication in which the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC") restored LTV's terminated
pension plan on the grounds that the company was in fact able to pay
the benefits itself.212 The lower court had held that the PBGC had not
followed adequate procedures in issuing its order, but the Supreme
Court reversed, explaining that since the section of the APA
governing informal adjudications2 13 did not require any procedures
beyond those employed by the Agency in that case, the courts were
powerless to require additional steps for the same reasons articulated
in Vermont Yankee.214
There are several reasons why singling out first-order agency
conduct through deconstruction does not violate LTV Corp. and
Vermont Yankee and, perhaps more importantly, does not represent
undue judicial interference with agency policymaking. First, in LTV
Corp., the Court explained that it was not displacing its position in
Overton Park that the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard
imposed a "general 'procedural' requirement" by forcing agencies to
create a judicially reviewable record.2 15 It went on to state that the
problem with the lower court's ruling was that it prescribed specific
extra-statutory procedures relating to LTV's role in the PBGC's
210. 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
211. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 548-49 (1978).
212. See LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 643.
213. See 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2012).
214. See LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 655-56.
215. Id. at 654.
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decision-making process, thus interfering with the legislative
prerogative to set those procedural standards and subjecting agencies
to an intolerably uncertain procedural regime.216 Professors Jack
Beermann and Gary Lawson endorsed this interpretation of LTV
Corp. as the "natural reading" of the case and were "not convinced
that hard-look review violates Vermont Yankee [because] [h]ard-look
review does not necessarily force agencies to adopt any specific
procedures.... Vermont Yankee and hard-look review can peacefully
coexist." 217
Deconstruction comports with Professors Beermann's and
Lawson's reading of LTV Corp. It does not require or even
encourage courts to articulate specific procedural requirements for
specific parties, nor does it force courts to pass judgment on the
adequacy of the specific agency procedures in a given case. At its
core, deconstruction merely creates the opportunity for courts to view
agency action through a more detailed lens, not to reach specific
conclusions about the validity of specific agency conduct. Second, to
the extent deconstruction involves judicial review of administrative
procedure, it looks to specific categories of first-order, procedural
conduct to determine if that conduct either adversely affected the
court's ability to engage in its own statutorily required judicial review
or was influential enough to render the second-order policy decision
by the agency arbitrary and capricious. Both of these analyses are
independently justified by the judicial review provisions of the
APA,218 and as such they should be read as consistent with the
statute's procedural provisions.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Vermont Yankee and
LTV Corp. are largely inapposite to deconstruction. If any of the
procedural categories singled out by deconstruction are ultimately
found to violate the Vermont Yankee rule, courts can still choose not
to consider those categories for precisely that reason without
sacrificing the overall usefulness of deconstruction. 219 The ultimate
value of deconstruction lies in its shifting the courts' perspective on
arbitrariness review from a monolithic view of agency policymaking
216. See id. at 655 (explaining that the "procedural inadequacies cited by the court all
relate to LTV's role in the PBGC's decisionmaking process").
217. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 7, at 871, 882. But see Pierce, supra note 7, 904-
10 (2007) (arguing that the judiciary's implementation of hard look review could be
understood to violate Vermont Yankee).
218. See § 706(2)(A).
219. See Beermann & Lawson, supra note 7, at 882 ("[Ilf courts apply hard-look review
in a manner that is sensitive to the Vermont Yankee problem, it will not push agencies
into procedures not mandated by law.").
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to a more detailed analysis of the discrete steps within that process. If
procedural considerations were to threaten the bounds of Vermont
Yankee or any other established doctrine of administrative law, that
could just as easily be seen as a benefit, rather than a cost, of
deconstruction. The increased judicial insight into the agency's
conduct that revealed the Vermont Yankee problem may not have
been available under the current approach to hard look review.
Rather than force courts into untenable positions, deconstruction
opens up the full panoply of normative and practical considerations
for the courts and allows for more thorough, effective, and
transparent review.
CONCLUSION
Judicial review of administrative agencies raises some of the most
persistent and fundamental issues in American law. Among them is
the question of how courts should evaluate agency policy decisions.
On the one hand, the separation of powers and institutional
competencies support wide agency discretion in setting and pursuing
policy goals. On the other, some measure of restraint is necessary to
ensure that agencies do not act arbitrarily or capriciously by either
overreaching their authority or succumbing to corrupting political
influences. The current solution to this tension between courts and
agencies over administrative policymaking is hard look review. Since
its inception, it has been the subject of significant attention and
controversy among courts and commentators. Opinion has appeared
to coalesce, however, around the idea that hard look review is a
unilateral concept-a single legal standard applied across the entirety
of an agency's decision-making process.
That is where hard look review has fallen short. Even a cursory
review of the Supreme Court's hard look jurisprudence demonstrates
that the Court is aware that different modes of agency conduct may
merit different applications of the arbitrariness standard, yet it is
seemingly unable or unwilling to develop a coherent theory to
address that reality. That is where deconstruction comes in. Rather
than being treated as a one-dimensional instrument, arbitrary and
capricious review can and should be broken into its component parts.
More specifically, theoretical lines should be drawn among the
different modes of reviewable agency conduct in order to better
reflect the multifaceted nature of policymaking. This deconstruction
of agency policymaking creates an opportunity to develop a
comprehensive framework for hard look review that is not only
currently lacking, but is also both normatively and practically sound.
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That is the goal and desired contribution of this Article. It
deconstructs hard look review in order to offer greater insight into
the individual aspects of agency policymaking and their relationship
with judicial review. This new perspective on hard look review reveals
potential normative, institutional, and systemic benefits for the entire
administrative state.
